Joseph Asunka joins Dan Banik to discuss what Africans themselves are saying about democracy, governance, and opportunity amid shifting global and local realities. Drawing on data from across the continent, they explore youth frustration and activism, the persistence of “big man” politics, and why reliable citizen data is essential for Africa’s democratic future.
As global politics shifts and economic pressures mount, understanding what citizens actually think — not what outsiders assume they think — has never been more important. In this episode, Dan Banik speaks with Joseph Asunka, CEO of Afrobarometer, the pan-African, non-partisan research network that has become the world’s leading source of high-quality data on what Africans are thinking about democracy, governance, the economy, and society. The conversation explores the paradox of political engagement in a digital age — where young people are more likely to mobilize on social media or take to the streets than to join parties or vote. Dan and Joseph discuss the widening generational gap between citizens and leaders, the persistence of “big man” politics, and the crucial role of credible data in strengthening accountability and democratic resilience.
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[Dan]
Joseph, it’s lovely to see you. You know I’m a huge fan of Afrobarometer, and I’ve wanted to speak with you for a while. Great to have you here today—early morning in San Francisco. Good morning, and welcome to the show.
[Joseph]
Thanks so much, Dan. It’s great to connect—I feel like I know you more than I actually do. And thank you for being an advocate and supporter of Afrobarometer’s work. It’s a real pleasure to be here.
[Dan]
Joseph, the world order is being upended. There’s an ongoing tariff war, and many African exports are being hit, in some cases severely. From your vantage point—especially given you’re currently based in the U.S.—what’s the mood in African capitals? Is there optimism? Worry? Are governments leaning more toward China? What’s your take?
[Joseph]
Even before this turmoil, Afrobarometer data from 30-plus countries—39 in total—showed sentiment turning negative from around 2015. When we ask citizens about the overall direction of their country, a growing majority say it’s going the wrong way—over 60% of the population continent-wide. That’s independent of the current geopolitical tensions.
When we ask about the most important problems governments should address, unemployment ranks at the top on average, though there are nuances. In Burkina Faso, for example, crime and insecurity dominate; in Benin, infrastructure is a priority. But unemployment leads overall.
I mention these because the new geopolitical dynamics—including tariffs—are compounding long-standing concerns. During the “Africa rising” period (roughly 2010–2015), there was optimism: self-reported living conditions improved, and experiences of deprivation (e.g., going without food) declined. Since 2015, those trends reversed. People report more frequent deprivation—food, cash income, healthcare—and believe their countries are headed in the wrong direction.
The current tensions and aid cuts risk worsening this: people are losing jobs, and opportunities funded by aid are shrinking. We’re in the field now, finalizing about 10 surveys. While we don’t have the data yet, it’s possible these negative sentiments will intensify.
[Dan]
Some small countries have been hit with big tariffs, and South Africa too—it’s across the board. I want to return to jobs. A consistent theme in Afrobarometer reports is the hunger for employment, particularly among a very young population frustrated by slower-than-hoped economic progress. I recall a report—perhaps earlier this year or last—where corruption ranked lower than jobs as a public priority. Can you say more about this frustration among the continent’s youth?
[Joseph]
There are several tensions, and unemployment amplifies them. On average, people under 35 are more educated than older cohorts, yet more likely to be unemployed. That mismatch creates deep frustration. You have a large pool of skilled young people who struggle to find opportunities to contribute to national development and secure livelihoods.
[Dan]
Is part of the problem our own making—universities emphasizing general degrees over vocational skills and training? Is the education system partly to blame?
[Joseph]
Perhaps partly, but the larger issue is a shortage of opportunities. Even technically skilled youth can struggle to find jobs or start businesses. Conditions for private enterprise—political and governance environments—often aren’t conducive. Universities may over-emphasize exam performance over job-ready skills, and that’s a factor. But the critical piece is whether the broader environment enables private initiative to thrive.
[Dan]
Another theme my students and colleagues raise is political representation. Leaders are often much older, and parties don’t seem to prioritize youth preferences. There seems to be widespread dissatisfaction: despite rising education, the avenues for youth to influence politics feel narrow.
[Joseph]
You’ve hit the nail on the head. The median age in Africa is about 19, while the average head of state is in their 70s—a gap spanning roughly three generations. Priorities diverge. The continent’s future should reflect young people’s preferences, but older leadership often wants continuity with the past. This clash fuels frustration. We see declining political party affiliation among youth; they’re less interested in joining party institutions. That spills over into lower turnout—young people are less likely to vote than older generations. They’re politically active—especially online—but increasingly disengaged from formal institutional channels.
[Dan]
You mean the party structures?
[Joseph]
Yes—parties and other formal institutions. Youth are opting out of party membership and, consequently, are less likely to vote. It’s not apathy; they’re active on other channels. But they’re moving away from the formal architecture.
[Dan]
Parties are often controlled by a single financier—usually not young—who shapes conventions and leadership contests. There’s also a cultural element in some societies that equates age with wisdom. I recall Malawi’s Atupele Muluzi facing minimum age rules for candidacy years ago. Another paradox: youth may not vote as much, yet they’re highly active online and in protests. Your reports show strong youth protest participation. So they’re vocal on social media and in the streets, but, as you say, less active at the ballot box.
[Joseph]
That’s the paradox. Youth frustrations are legitimate—unemployment, exclusion from decision-making—and online platforms offer an outlet. They’re also more likely than older cohorts to protest; think of Gen Z protests in Kenya or anti-police-brutality protests in Nigeria. But translating that energy into voting—where change can be institutionalized—often falls short. Part of the issue is limited alternatives: if older elites control parties, youth may feel they’re choosing among the “least bad” options. Without meaningful avenues inside the system, protests and online expression become the primary channels—sometimes leading to state suppression. Governments should create pathways for youth to participate meaningfully in party life and decision-making to channel that energy constructively.
[Dan]
WhatsApp plays a major role—used by entrepreneurs and parties alike for mobilization, but also for disinformation. It seems influential in some elections, right?
[Joseph]
Absolutely. Most young people belong to multiple WhatsApp groups. News and political content circulate rapidly—often before anyone visits a news website. It’s a powerful tool for engagement and information, but also for spreading falsehoods. Still, WhatsApp could help parties include youth in decision-making. Internal party primaries are expensive; fees are prohibitive for unemployed youth. If parties valued “social capital”—ability to mobilize supporters—alongside money, charismatic, tech-savvy young people (and women) could qualify as candidates and contribute more meaningfully.
[Dan]
Many observers cite the “big man” syndrome—voters preferring resource-rich candidates who can distribute benefits. That makes it harder for youth with good ideas but limited means. How pervasive is this?
[Joseph]
It’s widespread. To contest for president or parliament—even within a party—you need substantial resources. Combined with poverty and disillusionment, voters may gravitate to wealthy candidates who can offer handouts or jobs. This entrenches moneyed elites and creates near-impossible barriers for young people and women without comparable resources.
[Dan]
So how can youth break through? They’re numerous and visible, but often unheard and excluded.
[Joseph]
They’re a crucial voting bloc. Parties court them during campaigns because they matter electorally. Youth can leverage that by mobilizing—using the same social media prowess—to vote in large numbers. Credible threats to vote leaders out if they ignore youth priorities can shift incentives. Even within parties, youth can organize to unseat underperforming incumbents. The key is participation; disengaging from voting reduces their leverage.
[Dan]
There are examples of youth-driven change, but sustaining it is hard. Movements don’t always become durable parties. Fragmentation also matters—youth votes can split along ethnic, regional, or linguistic lines. If they could coalesce around issues like employment, their impact might be greater.
[Joseph]
Agreed. Total unity isn’t necessary. Even within diverse alignments, youth can coordinate around accountability: if leaders don’t deliver, organize to replace them—within parties or constituencies. Politicians are sensitive to electoral risk. Youth have the numbers; coordinated, credible threats can work. But again, that requires showing up to vote.
[Dan]
Your studies—including work by your director of surveys, my friend Boniface Dulani in Malawi—show strong, enduring support for democracy in countries with embedded democratic norms, alongside dissatisfaction with democratic performance. With many elections in 2024 and more in 2025, what’s your overall assessment? Are elections largely free and fair? Are expression rights respected? Is transparency improving?
[Joseph]
It’s a mixed picture. On the positive side, elections clearly mattered in places like Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Ghana, producing real change and reinforcing trust in democratic institutions—Senegal’s constitutional court is a recent example.
On the negative side, executives often dominate, weakening checks from legislatures and judiciaries. A major concern is term-limit evasion. Across Afrobarometer’s data, support for presidential two-term limits is consistently high—even in countries without constitutional term limits. Yet some incumbents shift goalposts to extend their rule—examples include Togo and Côte d’Ivoire—deepening generational divides and undermining confidence.
[Dan]
Western donors emphasize governance and rights, often criticizing China’s influence—pointing to “development first” models and leaders who don’t relinquish power. Some say Rwanda’s model appeals to many: stability under a visionary leader. How valid are these critiques?
[Joseph]
Our data show strong, majority support for democracy across the continent. Alternatives like one-party or one-man rule are broadly unpopular (with some recent exceptions, e.g., in Mali). People value freedom of expression; we saw support dip during COVID-related restrictions, then rebound strongly afterward.
When we compare citizens who favor the “China model” of development to those who favor the U.S. model, their support for democracy is essentially the same. Africans want democratic governance and accountability—even if they also appreciate visible infrastructure. Authoritarian effectiveness is not broadly accepted as a trade-off, and Africa’s history includes long authoritarian spells without economic progress. Democratic and effective governance are not mutually exclusive.
[Dan]
Let’s talk about doing research on the ground. Afrobarometer operates across very different contexts—with security risks, weak infrastructure, disease outbreaks, floods, and so on. How do you conduct truly representative surveys under such varied conditions?
[Joseph]
We follow strict criteria, documented in our survey manual. First, we need a recent census frame (no older than 10 years) or robust projections to draw a representative sample. Second, political and security conditions must allow safe, face-to-face fieldwork—our random sampling can send teams anywhere in a country. If we can’t ensure safety, we pause—e.g., we’ve skipped Sudan and some rounds in Ethiopia due to inaccessibility. Third, we require a credible in-country institutional partner to lead research, analysis, and policy engagement. Fourth, citizens must be free to speak openly.
For episodic shocks—Ebola, cyclones, floods—we halt operations as needed. Fieldwork can be arduous: assistants have faced detentions, banditry risks, and extremely difficult terrain. Sometimes they improvise bridges or use horseback to reach remote areas. This complexity contributes to high survey costs.
[Dan]
Despite these hurdles, your team gets it done—which is one reason I’m so impressed. A final concern: 2025 has brought threats to aid, financing, statistical capacity, and global health priorities. U.S. aid has been dismantled. Many worry about funding large surveys and epidemic preparedness. How will Afrobarometer navigate this?
[Joseph]
This data is critical. Governments, civil society, and activists rely on it to align policies with citizen priorities. Afrobarometer treats data production as a core mission—not just a means to publications—and we make the data widely available, including for AI model training. Without Africa-specific data, AI systems used for policymaking risk being trained on non-representative inputs.
We have lost funding—USAID, for instance, and related partnerships with U.S. institutions like NED, USIP, and the State Department. We’ve paused some planned hires, especially in capacity building and analysis. Our strategy now is to establish an endowment: a one-time capitalization from multiple partners that could sustain core operations and prevent damaging stop-start cycles. Losing Afrobarometer would create major data gaps with knock-on effects for development planning.
[Dan]
I hope listeners in governments, donor agencies, think tanks, and philanthropy can help fill the gap left by USAID and others. I’m a big fan of your work and hope you go from strength to strength. Thank you for this conversation and for coming on the show.
[Joseph]
Thank you, Dan. It’s been a pleasure. I look forward to continuing the conversation.
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