Dan Banik speaks with Atul Kohli on why powerful states imperialize, the importance of sovereignty in the pursuit of development, the impact of China’s rise, and the future of Indian democracy.
Western imperialism has fundamentally shaped the developing world. In particular, Great Britain and the United States – the dominant capitalist powers of the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively, have played a major role in this historical process. But why did they pursue imperialism? And what effects did such imperial practices have on the developing world? These are the key questions that Atul Kohli examines in his brilliant new book, Imperialism and the Developing World: How Britain and the U.S. Shaped the Global Periphery (Oxford University Press, 2020). Kohli meticulously examines both the causes and consequences of modern imperialism. He finds that the impact of imperialism on the developing world has been primarily negative. Indeed, the key argument in the book is that there is an inverse relationship between imperialism and development, i.e., the less control a state has over its own affairs, the less likely it is that the people of the state will experience steady and inclusive economic progress.
Atul Kohli is the David K.E. Bruce Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University and one of the world’s leading experts in comparative political economy with a focus on developing countries.
(by Ingrid Ågren Høegh)
Banik Western imperialism has fundamentally shaped the developing world. In particular, Great Britain and the United States – the dominant capitalist powers of the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively, have played a major role in this historical process. But why did they pursue imperialism? And what effects did such imperial practices have on the developing world? These are the key questions that my guest examines in his brilliant new book, Imperialism and the Developing World: How Britain and the U.S. Shaped the Global Periphery (Oxford University Press). In this fantastic book, Atul Kohli meticulously examines both the causes and consequences of modern imperialism. He finds that the impact of imperialism on the developing world has been primarily negative. Indeed, the key argument in the book is that there is an inverse relationship between imperialism and development, i.e., the less control a state has over its own affairs, the less likely it is that the people of the state will experience steady and inclusive economic progress. Atul Kohli is the David K. E. Bruce Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University and one of the world’s leading experts in comparative political economy with a focus on developing countries. In this episode, Atul and I discuss whether imperialism is synonymous with colonialism, why powerful states imperialize, the varieties of colonialization strategies, the importance of sovereignty in the pursuit of development, and the impact of China’s rise on the future of imperialism. I hope you enjoy our conversation.
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Banik It is such a pleasure to see you again, and to have you on the show, Atul. Welcome.
Kohli Thank you for your interest and thank you for having me.
Banik I have been extremely fortunate, Atul, to be one of your many students over two decades ago. You've been a major inspiration to me, as you have to many others all over the world. Your books and articles have all been extremely influential in the development discourse. First of all, congrats on this latest book. Let's begin with a few conceptual issues, Atul. The first relates to your understanding of the term development. I can vividly recall in one of your classes that I attended, you defined development as a deliberate movement of societies towards a situation of more liveable life conditions. You also identified three critical elements of such liveable conditions: economic growth, redistribution of that growth and the importance of democracy for the redistribution or the benefits of growth. So, development as you put it then, two and a half decades ago, was a process where all of these goals were to be maximised, even though there may be trade-offs in the process. So, let me begin by asking you: do you still subscribe to that understanding of development?
Kohli Thank you for your kind words about my scholarship, Dan. As to the book at hand, as well as the early notes you have kept, thank you for keeping those notes, I still use that definition when I'm teaching courses on development. In the book, I implicitly have the same view, but I emphasise the economic growth and industrialisation process more as a benchmark for understanding whether countries are moving towards development or not. And distribution and democracy are in the background and in some cases, like Chile, where democracy was thwarted, I clearly view it as an anti-developmental intervention from outside. In that sense, yes, I continue to hold on to that definition. But more often than not, I focus on industrialisation as a benchmark.
Banik In the latest book, Atul, you address both imperialism and colonialism. What I particularly liked is your distinction between several types of imperialism. Most importantly you talk about formal and informal empire. How do you understand imperialism? Many consider it to be a controversial term. I'm asking you this because some would say imperialism is synonymous with colonialism. Is that your view? It doesn't look like it in terms of what I read in the book. In what ways are they distinct? Is imperialism more of an overarching concept, where colonialism is a subset?
Kohli Yes, that is right. You read it right. Imperialism I understand almost in a commonsensical dictionary meaning of that term. It is an effort by one state to control the political and economic fate of another state or people. That effort to establish control or significant influence can be more readily had if you control their territory and government directly, which then becomes the definition and understanding of colonialism, which is one form of imperialism. But it would be far too narrow an understanding of imperialism to equate it to colonialism. There are numerous cases both in British imperial history and the modern period in American efforts to establish an empire, where territorial control and direct control over the government of another people, was not deemed necessary to establish significant influence on matters that were consequential for the interest of metropolitan powers. And this set off influence without territorial control, I call informal empire, which is a term from Gallagher and Robinson, and many others have used it, though it remains rather controversial. And so, a fair amount of attention is devoted in the book to the spread of informal empire. But as definition is concerned, imperialism is indeed an umbrella concept, which includes both colonialism and informal empire.
Banik What I found fascinating is how well-structured the book is and the main argument. Maintaining that red thread throughout, which is that Western imperialism has fundamentally shaped the developing world and while imperialism has benefitted the US and Britain, it has mainly had negative impacts in developing countries. I really liked your argument that the loss of sovereignty has been the biggest casualty, right? If you can please explain this core argument of yours in the book, that national sovereignty is an economic asset, and how and why sovereignty is a necessary precondition for effective states?
Kohli Yes, that is the core argument. In this modern day and age, where globalisation sort of became a mantra, as if the more integrated developing world would become with the global economy, the better off they would be. I felt a strong need to look at the historical examples, which certainly told a cautionary tale, that every time sovereignty of developing countries was deliberately undermined by Western powers, the impact was hardly benign. So, if globalisation was supposed to be so wonderful, how come when Britain colonises India and maintains open economic relationships, why doesn't India do well? Why doesn't Sub-Saharan Africa do well? United States continuously has open economic relationships with Latin America, especially to countries south of its border. In Central America, in the Caribbean. Why did these countries not do better, if open economic access was supposed to be so wonderful for their futures? So that led me into exploring historical examples and instead of just making a blunt argument that colonialism is not good for the developing world, which has been made numerous times, the issues was to see the importance of sovereignty for economic development in various nuances. I was drawn to the idea that degrees of sovereignty matter in terms of economic outcomes. Colonialism, I ended up arguing, tends to be worse for economic outcomes, whereas some intermediate situation of informal empire, does allow some degree of growth, but without distribution, without diversification, without often democracy. In that sense, it's not to be ignored, but informal empire gave some benefits to developing countries that colonialism did not. But less so than full sovereignty. I examine towards the end of the book the countries that become truly sovereign, such as China and India, in the modern-day period, do much better at development than semi-sovereign countries of Latin America, especially during the days of Washington Consensus, when the US re-established influence to impose economic policies on Latin America to ensure that American banks got paid back. That's the type of argument about the importance of economic sovereignty and how it can be leveraged for development. I treat sovereignty as precondition for the development of effective states. In this book I don't talk as much about the conditions for the emergence of effective states, that's the earlier book I wrote, so in a sense the two books can be read as two volumes.
Banik I was thinking we could introduce that 2004 book slightly later in the conversation. In this new book, there are two major questions that you tackle. One is why powerful states imperialise. Second, the impact of such imperialism in development countries. Let's begin with the motivations. Some would say that it isn't just economic interests. There may be all kinds of other motivations: political pressures, promoting democracy, nation-building, etc. You argue that it is mainly the national economic interest that motivates these imperialists. Why is that the case, Atul, and is the evidence very clear-cut? How do you think the US and Britain have justified imperialism?
Kohli That last question would take us in a slightly different direction in terms of the legitimacy issue. Let me get back to the core question you raised about how strong the evidence is and why I choose to emphasise national economic interest as the motive driving imperialism. I am arguing against both Marxist arguments as well as Realist arguments, that is to say that I am arguing that imperialism is not only moved by the economic interests of metropolitan capitalists, and I am arguing you cannot reduce imperialism mainly as a security motive. Instead, governments are the key actors in imperialism, it's governments that imperialise, in the end it's very much a political process. In that sense you have to explain why governments choose to imperialise, and unless you buy the Marxist argument that governments of advanced capitalist countries are no more than just executive committees of the bourgeoisie, an argument I don't buy, you have to then understand what motivates governments to go out and consistently intervene in the developing world. The evidence I found reasonably strong is often, these governments thought their countries would benefit from access to these peripheral markets. And in that process, of course they are taking account of the interest of metropolitan capitalists, but it's a broader understanding of national interest. Economic interest, but strong economies also means powerful states. In that sense, economic motive is at the same time a political motivation. That's why I use the term national economic interest. The argument is strong in about two thirds of the cases I analyse, and not as strong in the other third.
Banik In terms of the last bit, let's say in Britain, how was it that the elites legitimised these acts of imperialism, colonialism, within their borders. Was it a clear-cut argument that colonialism is good for us, it's good for trade, you'll all benefit, etc.?
Kohli Yes, world betterment has been the consistent theme across Britain and the US. You can go back to 19th century British statesmen talking about their main goal being world betterment, and then you can jump to Woodrow Wilson in the US, or late in the 20th century to Bush trying to help the "fate of Iraqi people." World betterment whether that's understood as economic improvement due to free trade, bringing democracy, bringing civilisation, that has been a consistent theme, though of course that needs to be modified based on the historical time period and who you are colonising. It would be much harder to say vis-a-vis China that in the 19th century during the Opium Wars that you're bringing civilisation. The Chinese were pretty civilised, and they thought the British were the barbarians. Those things have to be modified based on place and time. Overall, the one consistent theme has been that we are better than them and we hope to help them climb up the ladder.
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Banik Continuing on this theme, Atul, in many of my interactions I've been told that there have been numerous positive benefits and you touch on this in your book that in terms of creating political institutions, infrastructure, railways, the English language being this binding force in India. My students have often pointed to the introduction of liberal ideas and their role in addressing say women's empowerment or combatting practices such as widow-sacrifices, etc. I'm in agreement with you that the impact has been mainly negative, but how do you think we should balance some of these positive socio-political effects with the overwhelmingly negative economic effects?
Kohli That's a good question. It needs to be thought about. How do you assess costs and benefits? But think of it this way: if after 200 years of colonial impact, nothing good was left behind, what sort of brutal rule would that have been? The fact that the British are in India for 200 years and after that Indians speak English and have some railways, is that enough? You can do that in 20 years. Japan and Korea in 50 years achieved enormous amounts of "brutal development" through repression but also transformed those societies. So, after 200 years, if there was nothing there to be appreciated, that would be enormously damaging. One can admit to some good things colonialism left behind, and I do agree with that, but on the whole, that fact is, when India becomes independent, the average age of life expectancy of an Indian is 30 years. And that has to be the final barometer of what the impact of rule was.
Banik I agree with that, Atul. One of the most negative effects of British rule in India is famines. The total lack of responsibility and accountability of the colonial rulers, we're talking about millions of people who perished. The only good thing that came out I suppose were the codification of so-called Indian famine codes, a set of instructions to the bureaucrats as to what they should be looking out for. Some sort of early warning system. I obviously agree with you. Famines are another persuasive case in this context of highlighting the major negative impacts that British colonialism had on India.
Kohli Yes, I agree. I chose not to write more about famines, but I'm glad you have worked on that theme. I did not focus on it. But coming back to socio-political possible plusses against economic negatives, I think this is more a specifically Indian case. If you shift to Africa, even on socio-political side, the British legacy for example in the 19th century, and early 20th century, is pretty negative. They hardly leave behind good institutions. They wish to run African empire on the cheap and they hardly put effort into creating centralised armies, or civil service, some things India got at least after 200 years. And so, you end up in countries like Nigeria with highly fragmented states, politicisation of ethnicity along regional lines, because during the colonial period a central government was never created. So, India in some ways after 200 years did a little better on the institutional side, but not on the economic side. A country like Nigeria ends up with terrible institutions and deep economic underdevelopment after the colonial period.
Banik You examined some of these issues in your previous book, focusing on state building. In this book, you have a chapter on the varieties of colonisation, comparing India and Nigeria. Could you reflect a bit more on that comparison? What distinguishes the institution-building in India and why didn't it take place in Nigeria? Britain gained economically far more from India than Nigeria. Are these two issues connected? That maybe there is something about Britain being in India for a longer period or investing more in institutions, creating a civil service, because it was gaining so much more and not doing the same in Nigeria?
Kohli Yes, I think the two are related and it is also the case that Britain comes to Africa much later, after the scramble for Africa in the late 19th century. For the most part, the British did not have high economic hopes for sub-Saharan Africa. There was some hope that maybe once railroads were developed there could be mines and minerals to be discovered, maybe cotton production could be boosted, but on the whole, they did not expect enormous economic advantage from sub-Saharan Africa. The scramble is as much political in the sense of keeping the French out, as it is economic so as to get something out of Africa. India, as you know, had a very different trajectory. The East India Company went to India to make riches, and riches they made. Because Indian monarchs and landed classes had expropriated enormous amounts of wealth of Indian peasants, there was a lot more land-based wealth to be had in India. So, revenue could be collected and because revenue needed to be collected, a civil service was needed. And since this is 19th century, there is a need to build a centralised army, not only to conquer India, but then to spread the empire into the near abroad, so Indian soldiers are used for the Opium Wars in China, Indian soldiers are used to spread British Empire into Malaysia, Singapore, as well as towards the Middle East in the other direction. So there were military and economic needs that led to development of better institutions in 19th century India, a centralised army, as well as a civil service. By contrast, by the time the British colonised Africa in the 20th century, the mindset has become that these colonies have to be run on the cheap. If there are economic benefits, great, otherwise Britain was not willing to spend much money. And since land wealth was minimal, taxation of it was minimal, very little effort went into building institutions that were a product of other interests such as spreading empire or collecting revenues in the case of India. So what you end up with is, because of different interests, India ends up with institutions whereas once capitalism is mature, the main interest for Africa is possibly trade and extraction of minerals. Other than that, the British don't have deep interest in extracting land revenues in Africa. As a result, a variety of institutional developments follow.
Banik I found that chapter you have on the East India Company to be wonderful reading. There is so much rich empirical material there. You also mention the Royal Niger Company. And I'm wondering, it's interesting that you have these private sector entities expanding their operations in distant lands, and then the British state taking over, I'm wondering what you think characterised that relationship between the British state and the East India Company or Royal Niger Company? Because it appears to me after reading your book that the personal ambitions of some of the representatives of the companies, they mattered a great deal, right? So was it the personal ambitions of these leaders that laid the foundations and then the British state took over? But also during these interventions by these entrepreneurial individuals, the British state was still actively involved in supporting the company, wasn't it?
Kohli Oh yes. These companies were a product of royal charters, so in that sense, the British state has given them permission to be monopoly actors in these parts of the world. There is a direct relationship. That was the nature of the British spread of colonialism, including ships and companies that went to Chesapeake Bay and established the empire in the Americas. In that sense, private companies leading, whether Dutch East India Company or East India Company, later in a much more bizarre form, United Fruit Company buying up land in central America, and then about to lose it, and then the US comes and intervenes, like in Guatemala, which is the cover of my book. Private companies leading and states being closely associated is one important strand of imperialism. It originates with Dutch East India Company. We still see some of it in the modern world, when American government seeks to protect nationalisation of American companies who got there first.
Banik I love the cover of the book. Returning to the distinction between formal and informal empires, why do imperialists choose to colonise some countries, such as Britain in India and Nigeria, while in other cases, Britain's actions in say Argentina, Egypt and China, is much more of an informal model or variant? So in some cases there was the use of say brutal force, while in other cases it wasn't used. Related to this is the impact on developing countries themselves. The question is, does it matter to developing countries what type of imperialism they are exposed to? Is this somehow related to economic growth patterns?
Kohli Yes, it matters greatly. If you look at growth figures, the Argentine economy does quite well under British informal imperial influence. For much of the 19th century, up to the 20th century, Argentine economy rose moderately well at the turn of the century. But the Argentine economy never recovers post-1930s tells an earlier story, which is the type of economic development Argentina underwent. They became a commodity producing economy, run by landowning interests of Argentina, which had very little interest in pursuing a national project that might involve industrial transformation. So, countries like India end up with neither the benefit of commodity-led growth, in part because India's commodity exports never meshed well with British needs, India ended up being an exporter of opium to China, and Chinese tea sold back in Britain, so Britain establishes a triangular trade vis-a-vis the Indian colony. It dumps manufacturing goods like textiles into India, doesn't buy back much from India, Indian opium goes to China, and Chinese tea to Britain. In the process, the economic growth of India is minimal. By contrast, Argentinian exports are much in demand in Britain, as well as elsewhere over time, the US as well. So commodity-led growth does get Argentina a lot further than India. By early 20th century, Argentina has some prospects of modernisation, which don't come to fruition, mainly as a result of the ruling coalition favouring commodity-dependence. In that sense, they invite dependent development, rather than push forward a more autonomous industrialisation process.
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Banik Let's move on to the impact of the US in the developing world. One of the many conclusions is what you conclude to be the US preference for informal empires. I would like you to reflect on why that is the case. Why did the US not choose full-fledged colonies? Is it because they had different motives than the British? Different economic situation? The power of the US economy unlike the British?
Kohli That's a very important question. The first thing to notice is that I don't think it's fair to juxtapose British vs. American in 19th and 20th centuries, because a good chunk of what Britain is doing in 19th century is already informal empire. The three parts of the world you mentioned, the Ottoman Empire, the Chinese Empire and much of Latin America, Britain's mode of influence in these parts of the world, Britain itself chooses not to colonise these. You can ask the same question you're asking about the US vs. Britain, you could ask that in 19th century comparing India and China. You could ask why, in the middle of the 19th century, Britain chooses to establish crown rule in India after the Mutiny, but after the Opium War chooses to establish informal empire in China? So, it's the same type of question, but let's focus more directly on the question you asked. One simple answer about why US didn't follow colonial pattern is that it's 20th century rather than 19th century. By now, self-determination is becoming a major issue. Woodrow Wilson himself committed the US to self-determination. The US was an anti-colonial country. In that sense it was an ideological hesitation at a deep level to acquire territories. If you look at US history, when they were acquiring Cuba, there was enormous debate in American Congress. The Teller Amendment had to be passed before the US decided to go to war with Spain in the late 19th century. The Teller Amendment was essentially that the US was not going to occupy Cuba. So, as early as late 19th century, and well into the 20th century, with the exception of the Philippines, the US really did not have a taste for colonies. However, they had a strong taste, and there was near economic consensus in late 19th century, that US needed external markets to help its own capitalist economy. How to square this circle has been a persistent struggle in American foreign policymaking towards poorer countries. Their solution was their own Philippine model, which was as they described it at the time, it would be an iron fist in a velvet glove. And that's equivalent of their mantra of how informal empire would be conducted. That is, you will establish friendly regimes in the periphery, and the friendly regimes will maintain order and open their economies. Having stable subservience is the common mechanism that both Britain and US use to establish informal empire. The US has mastered that art much better than Britain. American economy was also much more capitalist by the time America becomes a great power, compared to Britain in the 19th century. In that sense, the US doesn't need territories. It has more territory than it needs by expanding its own land empire, so by the time the US becomes an overseas power, the fact that it's an anti-colonial countries, self-determination is on the global agenda, the fact that the US doesn't need territories but needs markets - all of these factors combined give the US a preference for informal empire.
In the post-World War 2 period, in Asia, it has become very difficult to re-establish stable subservience, as a result of emerging nationalist movements. That's true of Vietnam, where they fight and lose. And true of China and India and Indonesia. That possibility does not exist, and there is a clear break in establishment of nation-building in Asia as a result of nationalist movements. That is not the case in Latin America, with the stable subservience model, it is America's backyard. That model is used much more in Latin America, and to an extent in the Middle East. But, that model is not possible in the post-war period East Asia, apart from few countries like Philippines, to an extent Korea and Taiwan, which are more Cold War cases.
Banik Continuing with the post-war period, I was fascinated with all the interventions you list in the book, American interventions. Philippines, Korea, Laos, Cambodia, Guatemala, but you chose three cases: Iran, Vietnam and Chile. Why did you choose these countries and what are the distinctive features of these three cases?
Kohli Well, some cases had to be chosen, so I chose those three. I regret not having discussed Guatemala more, because Iran and Guatemala happen around the same time. Those three cases reflect three parts of the world in which the US tried to establish influence: Middle East, Latin America, Asia with less success. So, the three cases, with Vietnam where they lose, in Iran where it forestalled democracy, and Chile that many Americans think was a successful intervention. Those cases not only reflect America's regional interests, they also reflect three strategies of spreading influence, from hard militarism in Vietnam, covert regime change in Iran and Chile, and imposition of Washington Consensus in Latin America, which is a third strategy of America's informal empire building, which is multilateral collaboration through the IMF and World Bank. These three strands have been part of the repertoire to establish informal empire.
Banik When I think about it, it seems like the British gains from imperialism and colonialism are much more important than say the ones resulting from US interventions. Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, huge losses of life on both sides, war is also very costly, the US got stuck in many of these countries for a long time. What did the US get out of all these interventions in the post-war period? What actually worked? Because when you discuss multilateral institutions and those partnerships and the impact that had in Latin America, I see it to be mainly negative, this anti-American feeling, do you think something good came? Obviously, some access to markets, but politically it wasn't that good or successful, was it?
Kohli I think costs and benefits have to be assessed in terms of how much effort goes into it. Of course, the US has a giant economy and what does it get out of Chile? Could it be seen as economic advantages at all? You have to keep in mind how little it cost them to do it. US interventions have to be seen more in systemic terms. US is setting boundaries on what is possible, desirable, and benefits to them are much harder to measure. British benefits from India, I have tables and tables to document it. You can show advantages. It is much harder to do for the US, to say it really benefitted from intervening in Chile. On the other hand, it certainly forced all the possibility of social democracies spreading in Latin America. They drew the boundary that this is a boundary that you will not cross. The same thing, the coup in Iran, they told the world that nationalisation of oil will be costly, and it took another two decades before countries had to nationalise oil. In that sense, US empire has to be understood more as a system-wide process and the US gains in systemic terms. You cannot think of them in direct, narrow sense. You have to think in systemic terms.
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Banik A final set of overarching questions, the first issue is the future of imperialism. I've been studying China, China in Africa, there is of course tension between the US and China, some have been using the "new scramble for Africa" narrative to characterise Chinese interests on the continent. One thing I find fascinating and I would like to hear your thoughts on it, why did the US consistently, especially in the last decades, why has it neglected Africa? China has been far superior in that sense in terms of building infrastructure, cultivating soft power, providing loans and grants, whereas America has just not been there. Even now, there is a sort of hesitancy to engage with the African continent. So, in terms of the future of imperialism, could you reflect on China and its ambitious projects? The US position seems to be anti-China, but in many parts of Africa far more balanced, positive view of China's role.
Kohli Good question. Emerging trends are so hard to write about. My concluding thoughts in the book are that China's ambitions is more to create dependency rather than spreading an informal empire. The distinction is that these countries are becoming economically dependent on China, either through loans or investments, but at the same time, China has so far stayed away from use of coercion, which in my thinking is pretty essential for ambitions to establish informal empire. I think so far, except maybe in Sri Lanka, where China used its economic leverage to secure a port, that comes pretty close to looking like a traditional informal imperial action the US might have taken. Short of that, China hasn't moved in that direction. Will it move in that direction? Yes, if they can get away with it, I think what keeps them back is that they don't know if they can get away with it. They are still operating from a position of military weakness when it comes to Africa. Yes, US has neglected Africa, but it neglected it mainly because it left it to the British and the French to still continue their interests in that area. So Commonwealth and Francophone Africa have been sort of left to Britain and France. US has instead concentrated on Latin America, oil in the Middle East, and dynamic economies of East Asia leaving sub-Saharan Africa. There, China has moved in. Will there be a new scramble for Africa? I doubt it. Not in the old-fashioned sense. But there are already competing ambitions for influence in Africa. Even Russia now wants to get into the game. There are countries where there are both Chinese and American bases. I suspect if African leaders are half-decently clever, which they are likely to be, they may be able to diversify dependence and take advantage of this competing imperial ambitions from outside.
Banik One final question on India and Indian democracy. We have both studied India. In recent weeks there has been a lot of focus on how India is not seen to be a democracy by Freedom House and V-Dem. India is categorised as being Partly Free. How do you see Indian democracy today? And, what are your thoughts on the future of Indian democracy? The role of Indian democratic institutions? And the capacity of these institutions to promote continued economic development?
Kohli I've been thinking a lot about that. The problem has come at a very personal level, in the sense that my former student, Pratap Mehta, just had to resign from Ashoka University. So, I'm mobilising to try to get him at least a temporary position for a year so he can breathe. It's cutting home very sharply, the decline of liberal spaces in India. I do agree with outside criticism that India's democratic spaces are getting curtailed. I'm saddened by it. I get angry at it. What is troubling me as a scholar is I don't understand why there is a need for this. When I think back to the Indira Gandhi period in India, her power base was threatened. It was almost something "rational" about her authoritarian response in the sense that she needed to preserve her power to do so, hence the Emergency. These guys are so powerful right now, the BJP in power, I don't understand why they need to curtail liberal spaces in universities. In some ways, they are riding a high wave, they can look good by allowing people to dissent a little bit. So, it's a bit puzzling to me. I think some of it is ideological, some of it is a reaction. When I read some more pro-BJP commentary about what is happening, say at Ashoka University, what you get is a sense that there is almost a jealousy of more anglicised Indians and their success in the world, they sort of want to bring down people like Pratap Mehta, but it's sort of a sense that these are Ivy League connected Indians who are connected and privileged and how dare they demand any special political space. So, I think there is an ideological component, there is some sort of lack of enlightenment in part of BJP leaders, an authoritarian streak which has been there all the way back from origin from RSS and Hindu nationalism. And, some of that is there. The state and business compact and in that, political spaces are narrowing because to continue to promote growth under conditions of growing inequality, you have to narrow and turn it more authoritarian. But unless you go to that type of analysis, I remain a little puzzled why the BJP is doing what it is doing at present. As to the emerging future, I think my wishful thinking is that India is bigger than the BJP, but I am afraid of the damage that these folks are likely to do in the short run.
Banik Atul, you've been one of my heroes, and it's been such a pleasure to speak to you today. Thank you so much for coming on my show.
Kohli Thank you for your interest, Dan. Your questions were terrific. I wish you well.
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Thank you for listening to In Pursuit of Development with Professor Dan Banik from the University of Oslo’s Centre for Development and the Environment. Please email your questions, comments and suggestions to inpursuitofdevelopment@gmail.com.