The Global South is increasingly visible in global governance. But visibility is not the same as power. In this season-opening episode, Dan Banik asks whether the real transformation underway is not the “rise” of the Global South, but a far more consequential struggle over who gets to write, enforce, and legitimize the rules of the international order.
The Global South is more visible, more vocal, and more organized than at any point in recent decades. But has that translated into real power? In this season-opening episode of In Pursuit of Development, Dan Banik challenges the familiar claim that the Global South is simply “rising.” His argument is more demanding. Gaining voice in global governance is not the same as gaining authority over the rules, institutions, and decisions that shape the international order.
Against the backdrop of collapsing foreign aid, an expanding BRICS, greater representation of developing countries in the G20, negotiations over a new UN tax convention, debates over IMF reform, and the selection of the next UN Secretary-General, the episode asks where power is actually shifting. And where it is not. The emerging pattern is striking. The Global South has made significant gains in institutions based on sovereign equality, but much less progress where weighted voting, veto power, and great-power privilege still dominate.
The episode also questions whether “the Global South” can meaningfully be treated as a single bloc. Instead, Dan argues that we are increasingly seeing flexible issue-based coalitions, in which countries cooperate on taxation, climate finance, debt, or institutional reform while competing fiercely on other questions. And as the traditional aid era recedes, the politics of development may increasingly shift toward domestic taxation, accountability, South–South cooperation, and new forms of financial power.
The central question for Season 7 is therefore not whether the Global South is rising. It is whether contestation can become renegotiation. And whether greater voice can ultimately be converted into the authority to write the rules.
Voice Without Authority: The Global South After Aid
Hello and welcome to a brand-new season of In Pursuit of Development.
Today I would like to pick up where we left off last season and lay out the argument that will feature throughout this whole season. My claim is that the Global South has, in recent years, won a great deal of “voice” in global governance, but far less “authority”.
The trouble with “the Global South”
But before discussing this distinction further, let me begin by complaining about my own vocabulary. I realize that this may be a strange way to open a new season!
The phrase is “the Global South”, which I have been using rather constantly in recent years. I use it in my lectures, in my published work, and on this podcast. Indeed, it is certainly being used much more today than at any point since the historic Bandung Conference of 1955. Many countries are comfortable using it even though there are some, especially I would argue in the Global North, who question whether the Global South is any better than similar terms we have used in the past, such as “low-income countries”, “developing countries”, etc. But although I am increasingly using the phrase, I am doing so with a sense of unease. Because I am, like perhaps many of you, am well aware of the numerous contradictions it entails.
As you may be aware, the Global South is sometimes used to signify a bloc in the sense of a group of countries that are acting together. Often because they have a common set of grievances (and claims) against the Global North. Sometimes it refers to a group of countries negotiating at a particular forum. At other times, it symbolizes a moral claim; meaning that many of these countries were colonized and typically bear the least responsibility for the current global climate crisis. And sometimes the Global South is simply a huge market to tap into.
Then there is the issue of which countries can be categorized as being part of the Global South. China is especially interesting here as it is projected to enter the high-income category either later this year or sometime next year. But while in the Global North there are voices claiming that this disqualifies China from claiming that they are a part of this group, Beijing itself is steadfast in its belief that it is firmly anchored in the grouping.
I could go on about the agreements and disagreements on this matter. But does this mean that we should we abandon the term?
I don’t think we should abandon it. Well, for a start, there is nothing better at the moment.
The term is often criticized for being imprecise. But its imprecision points to a gap between changing social or political realities. And rather than dismissing the phrase as vague, I think it actually illustrates how and to what extent something powerful is perhaps emerging.
But it certainly does mean that we need to be cautious about what we are claiming when we say that the Global South is rising. It may not be too controversial to claim that power has shifted and continues to shift. The more important question to address is whether rule-making authority has shifted.
So, what has actually changed?
The end of the aid era
In recent months, it appears to me that the donor–recipient relationship has collapsed, and, guess what, the Global South did not choose it!
Consider the facts. In 2025, official development assistance (ODA) fell by 23 per cent in real terms, down to around 174 billion dollars. It was actually the largest single-year aid contraction ever recorded, and the second consecutive year of decline. Foreign aid is now back to 2015 levels, the year the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted.
The United States is responsible for about 75 per cent of this decline. Particularly, aid to sub-Saharan Africa has fallen by 26 per cent. Another major power responsible for aid cuts is the United Kingdom. But there are also many others in Europe that have signaled or already undertaken drastic cuts.
The UN’s finances have also been in trouble for many years, and to make things worse core funding for the UN system has fallen by 27 per cent.
I think we should pay attention to how the aid era is not ending because the Global South wanted this to end right now. Rather, it is ending because the Global North appears to be walking away without any form of negotiations.
More seats at the table
But there is some good news. There has been an expansion of the institutional presence of the Global South.
The African Union is now a full member of the G20, and BRICS has expanded from 5 to 11 members, who together account for around 28 per cent of global GDP.
Between 2022 and 2025, the G20 was chaired by Indonesia, India, Brazil, and South Africa. These four consecutive presidencies had a major influence on what that group talked about and parts of the global economic agenda.
Consider another fact.
According to Afrobarometer, which does the excellent public opinion work across the African continent, 62 per cent of Africans rate China’s influence positively. The corresponding figure for the US is 52 per cent and 50 for the EU.
But the really interesting aspect of this is that people who like what China is doing on the continent also tend to like the US and Europe.
This type of strategy is often termed as “hedging”. But the evidence shows that playing the field and having multiple sources of support and collaboration is precisely what people want.
Voice versus authority
Let me now return to the distinction between voice and authority that I mentioned at the beginning of this episode.
Voice, as I understand it, means being present in a forum or a meeting and being heard. It is also about ensuring that an issue or a set of issues a country’s leadership prioritizes appears on the meeting agenda.
Authority, by contrast, is about contributing to making a rule that other countries must abide by. Authority is also about ensuring that the rule will be respected by a large majority even against the wishes of a powerful state or a superpower.
So, my argument is that, at least as of now, the Global South has managed to achieve substantial voice. Indeed, a louder voice. It has articulated its demands and achieved considerable success in coordinating its position (on not all, but on some issues). But in terms of authority, the record is rather mixed.
Four tests of authority
Let me offer four cases to illustrate this argument.
The G20
In November 2025, the US boycotted the Johannesburg G20 summit. But despite American objection, the summit leaders adopted a final declaration text that focused on climate change mitigation, debt relief and initiatives that emphasized diversity and gender equality
In many ways, this was the Global South exercising its “agency” and asserting its collective authority. And this authority held for a while. Until South Africa was disinvited from the Miami G20 summit that is scheduled for December 2026.
Now, what happened in September of this year is the really interesting story. During the BRICS summit in New Delhi, eleven countries, two of which are permanent members of the UN Security Council, defended the South African position in the final BRICS declaration. The text mentioned that South Africa is a founding and full member of the G20 and that membership of the group can only change when all members agree. And that arbitrary revision of membership is inadmissible.
The BRICS summit’s support for the South African G20 position is an example of how a group of countries can agree on a text over a superpower’s objection. They declared that South Africa’s exclusion is illegitimate. However, what a group like the BRICS is still unable to do is to compel the US to invite South Africa to the Miami summit.
This is indeed an example of the exercise of authority over the agenda, but not over the final outcome.
Let us consider another case: The UN tax convention, which I believe is a really strong case.
The idea of an UN-led tax convention began as an African Group initiative in the General Assembly. The goal is to move international tax rules out of the OECD (the rich-country club) into the UN, where every country, irrespective of size or financial muscle, has one vote.
The OECD has not been supportive of this new convention, and the United States withdrew in February 2025. But the negotiations have been ongoing with the fifth session concluding in August with full draft texts of the framework convention and two protocols on the table. In November of this year, the sixth session will meet in Nairobi, and the final text will be discussed at the General Assembly by the end of 2027.
The global coalition for this new tax convention has also widened with endorsement for it in from the BRICS. So, what began with the African Group now is supported by eleven countries that represent more than a quarter of the world economy.
This appears to me to be one of the clearest examples of rule-making that has moved out of a small and rich club and into a universal body because the Global South has insisted on it.
The selection of the next UN Secretary-General is also going to test the voice and authority of the Global South.
Seven candidates are officially still in the race, and all of them are either from Latin America, the Caribbean or Africa.
Whether one of these is actually confirmed is still uncertain as there are rumors that a consensus candidate will appear in the final stages.
This is more than likely as, according to a recent report, the “Trump administration opposes all options for new UN chief”
What would be great is if it was someone from the Global South AND a woman!
A final example of voice and authority concerns the IMF agreement on a quota increase under its Sixteenth General Review. These quotas determine who actually decides things at the Fund. But this quota increase is frequently reaffirmed in declaration after declaration. In reality, reaffirmation is not enforcement!
So far, then, we can conclude that there is a pattern that is emerging. The Global South has achieved major gains whenever rules are made in institutions built on sovereign equality (that is one country, one vote). Examples include the tax convention, General Assembly resolutions, etc.
But when rules are made in institutions built on weighted votes or great-power privilege (such as the Security Council, the IMF), the Global South has not achieved real gains. And the IMF quota system is an illustrative example.
Lessons for the next phase
So, how should we approach the next phase of global development?
Firstly, I think it is a mistake to view the Global South as one bloc.
Countries that agree on tax may not agree on climate finance. Those that agree on climate finance may not agree on Security Council reform. I think what we are seeing are the emergence of “issue coalitions”.
If you closely examine the text of the latest BRICS summit in New Delhi this year, there are several clues about how there is both support and disagreement within this grouping. For example, although the declaration mentions Chinese and Russian support for the aspirations of Brazil and India to “play a greater role” at the UN, note that the declaration does not mention “permanent membership”.
This does not mean that the BRICS summit was a failure. Far from it. But I think one lesson is that the Global North should not expect to negotiate with a unified “Global South”. Indeed, the Global South does not have an address. It does not have a secretariat. Its members do not always agree on a common position. And most importantly, the members of the Global South compete with one another as often as they coordinate.
Secondly, one key issue going forward is going to be credibility of those who talk about multilateral reform. In December in Nairobi, when the tax convention is negotiated, the Southern delegations will be able to assess how committed the Northern delegations are about rule making and a rules-based global order.
Thirdly, the finance architecture is going to be crucial. Just last week, the African Credit Rating Agency was launched in Port Louis. For decades, African countries have complained about how unfair the established credit rating systems were, which made it very difficult and expensive for them to borrow money. How effective this agency will turn out to be and how established institutions react to this new agency is something to watch out for.
Fourth, I do not think South–South Cooperation (SSC) always means a better deal.
I have written about this with Emma Mawdsley from the University of Cambridge, with Meera Venkatachalam from the University of Mumbai, and my colleague Benedicte Bull from the University of Oslo.
Although SSC often invokes solidarity, non-interference and win-win partnerships, there is in reality hard commercial bargaining and exceptionalist claims that great powers typically make about themselves. So, when China and India speak as representatives of the Global South, they also behave as major powers with very specific interests of their own.
In addition, the new bilateral agreements that are often prioritized in SSC may include conditionalities that are not always visible. We should therefore focus on better understanding the terms of these partnerships, how transparent these terms are, and who takes the major risk and who is held to account when a project underperforms or fails.
From New York to Lilongwe
In the final analysis, I would put it to you that voice in New York or Geneva may not be worth very much if there is no accountability in Lilongwe or Hanoi.
As some of you are aware, I have spent more than two decades doing fieldwork in Malawi. During this time, I have found that one of the main constraints on development outcomes is the fiscal contract. It is not only about how effective and how much the state raises in revenue from its own citizens, but also whether it must answer to citizens for how efficiently and for what purpose that revenue is actually spent.
In a world where foreign aid is fast disappearing, domestic resource mobilization is going to be crucial.
From contestation to renegotiation
So, to summarize, I do not think we should be asking whether the Global South is rising. I think you would agree that that question is largely settled. What we should be asking is how and to what extent the rules are being renegotiated. Not just contested.
Contestation is typically loud, and it produces impressive declarations at fancy summits and attractive sound bites for the media.
Renegotiation produces the actual text, in treaties that matter, that countries and governments must abide by.
That, then, is the framework I will pursue in season seven.
Thank you for listening. And thank you for coming back for another season.
I would be grateful if you could spread the word about this show on social media and share the episodes with friends and colleagues.
I'm Dan Banik, and you have been listening to In Pursuit of Development.