Dan Banik speaks with Benedicte Bull about how Latin America fits into the shifting idea of the “Global South.” Together, they explore what this identity means in practice, how the region balances ties to China and the United States, and what its experience reveals about power, justice, and development in a changing world order.
Dan Banik sits down with Benedicte Bull, professor of political science at the University of Oslo’s Centre for Global Sustainability, to unpack how Latin America understands (and helps redefine) the idea of the Global South.
Once used loosely to describe developing nations, the term has gained new political weight as global power becomes more diffuse and as countries in the South push back against the dominance of Western-led institutions. Drawing on years of research on Latin American elites, politics, and relations with China and the United States, Benedicte explains how the region navigates this shifting landscape: balancing economic pragmatism with questions of identity, solidarity, and autonomy.
The conversation moves from trade and diplomacy to development and sustainability, exploring how China’s growing influence has changed local economies and what this means for industrial capacity, climate policy, and inequality. Together, they reflect on the region’s long intellectual tradition, from dependency theory to modern debates on environmental justice, and why Latin American experiences continue to shape the global conversation on growth, democracy, and fairness.
** Check out this recent special issue of The Forum for Development Studies co-edited by Benedicte and Dan: The Rebirth of the Global South: Geopolitics, Imageries and Developmental Realities (2025)
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[Dan Banik]
I’m especially glad to have you here in the studio. You were one of my first guests when I started this podcast—five years ago, in the middle of the pandemic—and so much has changed since then. It’s lovely to see you. Welcome back to the show.
[Benedicte Bull]
Thank you. It’s great to be back in this basement studio. I see you often at the office, but it’s been a while since I’ve been here.
[Dan Banik]
You’ve worked extensively on China and Latin America. Give us a sense of how the rise of the “Global South” is playing out in the region.
[Benedicte Bull]
It’s fascinating. One thing I notice—serving on a research council in Chile that evaluates social science proposals—is how often applicants describe Chile as part of the Global South. I keep asking: what do you mean by that? In what ways does Chile have more in common with Nigeria or Thailand than with some “Global North” countries? So, part of the phenomenon is the spread of the term itself. People have wanted a new label for something they feel matters.
[Dan Banik]
You mean as a substitute for terms like “developing” or “Third World,” which were politically fraught, while “Global South” sounds better?
[Benedicte Bull]
Exactly. “Third World” is anachronistic, and “developing country” was long seen as condescending—though it’s coming back into use. “Global South” reflects changing realities to some extent, but it’s also about language that’s caught on.
[Dan Banik]
On identity: I was on a panel with a former Chilean ambassador to China who argued China isn’t a Global South actor. That struck me, because China often emphasizes belonging to the Global South. Is there a distinctive Latin American identity here—more Western, perhaps less explicitly anti-West—creating a certain tension?
[Benedicte Bull]
The term is political rather than geographical, and Latin America is divided over it. In a recent special issue we outline five different understandings of the Global South. Many Latin American politicians and intellectuals promote “active non-alignment”—not aligning with either China or the United States. That’s harder if you see both yourself and China as the Global South. The label carries an agenda: decolonization in various forms, more voice for Global South countries. But it’s hard to define who you’re “for” and “against.” In Latin America, the debate often maps onto left–right politics. Progressive governments—Brazil, Chile, Colombia, sometimes Mexico—use the term, but they’re cautious about sounding hostile to the U.S.
[Dan Banik]
So for some governments, adopting a Global South foreign policy can look like rejecting Western alliances—picking sides.
[Benedicte Bull]
Right. And Europe matters too. Latin America is Western in cultural terms—shaped by European heritage—so saying it’s not part of “the West” is complicated. Many prefer multiple identities: you shouldn’t have to choose sides; it’s about values and interests.
[Dan Banik]
Is it easier for leaders like Maduro to embrace the Global South than for, say, Chile or Argentina? Lula talks about it a lot—there’s been a clear rise in references since his return, whereas Bolsonaro avoided it. Does the term fit larger left-leaning countries more naturally than smaller or wealthier ones?
[Benedicte Bull]
A stark contrast is Argentina under Javier Milei—far-right, closely aligned rhetorically with the U.S.—who avoids “Global South” language, even as economic ties with China continue. Brazil can lean into the discourse; Mexico could too, but proximity to the U.S. constrains it. And yes, the China factor is central.
[Dan Banik]
Even if there are fewer mega-projects than in Africa, China is a dominant trading partner for many in Latin America. Historic ties might incline some leaders toward the U.S., but economic reality often points to China.
[Benedicte Bull]
No doubt—especially in South America. Mexico is the exception, with over 80% of its trade with the U.S. under USMCA. Elsewhere, China is indispensable: trade, investment—less in big loans recently, more in strategic sectors like renewables and technology. My angle is elites. It used to be mostly left-leaning politicians pushing ties with China—except in Chile, where fruit and wine exporters have dealt with China since the Pinochet era. That’s history now.
[Dan Banik]
Because traditional elites were more closely aligned with the U.S.
[Benedicte Bull]
Yes—education, networks, outlook. But their economic interests now often point to China. Beijing opened markets for Latin American exports, signed several free trade agreements, and proactively pursued cooperation. The U.S. already had agreements but created few new opportunities in recent decades. Chinese investment and the ease of doing business—logistics, technology—helped. Diplomatically, Latin American elites often feel more welcomed and courted in China. Scholarships and delegation programs build relationships across media, judiciary, and other sectors.
[Dan Banik]
China has been effective at relational power—steadily building ties while Europe tightens visas. Let’s link this to development. A unifying message among diverse Global South actors is: “We want development; our priorities aren’t respected; climate finance is inadequate; historical polluters must contribute more.” You see this in G20 dynamics—India bringing in the AU, Brazil and South Africa’s presidencies. Is there a Latin American sense of disappointment with the liberal international order—and a hunger for change or new institutions?
[Benedicte Bull]
Some of that, but less than in India or China. Latin America shares structural features with Brazil and India—high inequality, industrial bases, strong elites—but much of the anger is aimed at domestic elites rather than global institutions. Not universally, but broadly. Even in Argentina, with recurring debt crises, Milei’s main target is Peronism. In Venezuela’s deep crisis, public anger focuses on the government. So the impulse to “change the world” is muted by the drive to change domestic politics and reduce U.S. dependence (from the left), while the right has different priorities.
[Dan Banik]
How central is development to these debates?
[Benedicte Bull]
It’s there, but the global agenda has shifted. Our own institution’s name change—from “Development and the Environment” to “Global Sustainability”—says a lot about the Global North’s focus on green transition over development. In Latin America, you see environmental innovation, often led by Indigenous movements contesting extractive models. But the climate agenda’s credibility has suffered—well before Trump—and when U.S. policy can swing overnight, it undermines trust.
[Dan Banik]
There’s also the sentiment that Europe’s problems become global priorities, while Global South problems struggle for attention. People face immediate poverty and survival. They’re not rejecting climate action; they’re asking for resources, given historical emissions.
[Benedicte Bull]
Absolutely. And a distinct Latin American concern is dollar dependence. BRICS discussions on currencies resonate in Brazil and elsewhere. Currencies can depreciate overnight, upending economies that did everything “right.” That vulnerability breeds a sense of injustice. The North long failed to adapt policies to Southern needs; even symbolic gestures have faded.
[Dan Banik]
So the Global South narrative tries to re-insert justice into a geopolitically driven world—but it’s hardly cohesive. There are internal tensions—India versus China, and even Russia trying to claim “global majority” status. Another critique: bigger players like Brazil, India, and China may not prioritize smaller countries’ interests. Returning to development: have China’s ties actually promoted development in Latin America?
[Benedicte Bull]
The evidence is mixed. Macro studies haven’t found strong growth effects. In work with Antonio Rosales on Venezuela—a special case, with oil wealth, severe mismanagement, and U.S. sanctions—we looked at industrialization, diversification, and institutionalization. Chinese finance and later investments often operated with low transparency, weakening institutions and deepening resource dependence. We called it “structural stagnation,” not development. Venezuela is extreme, but the broader pattern is familiar: rising imports of Chinese manufactures and exports of raw materials, with a few exceptions—Chile’s lithium plus a new battery factory, for instance. Today’s global tariff environment and China’s industrial overcapacity make local industrialization even harder.
[Dan Banik]
We see this in EVs and solar: cheap Chinese products are good for climate goals, but challenge local manufacturing—whether in Brazil, Africa, or Europe.
[Benedicte Bull]
Yes. China’s dominance in solar and parts of the EV supply chain means the transition isn’t feasible without China. The question is how to limit over-dependence. Latin America’s past with dependency theory is instructive. Building local industry is particularly hard outside Brazil and Mexico. Mexico transformed under NAFTA, building export-oriented manufacturing. China has also invested in Mexico to export to the U.S., but current policy shifts may complicate that, and Chinese overcapacity could still pressure Mexican firms.
[Dan Banik]
Are there fresh development ideas emerging from Latin America, comparable to the earlier wave of conditional cash transfers?
[Benedicte Bull]
What’s currently “exported” are security models—hard-line approaches that set aside liberal rights to centralize control and crack down on crime. Nayib Bukele in El Salvador is the emblem. It’s a right-leaning, authoritarian trend, justified as the path to peace and prosperity—very different from cash transfers or “living with nature” approaches. Progressive, developmental policy innovation is less visible right now.
[Dan Banik]
That helps explain Bukele’s popularity—even among young people far beyond the region—despite Latin America’s painful history with law-and-order authoritarianism.
[Benedicte Bull]
Exactly. I started studying gangs in El Salvador in 1997. It’s hard to criticize from afar when people couldn’t safely walk outside or run small businesses without extortion. If you ignore due process and rights, you can get quick results—and many dictators were popular at some stage for solving urgent problems. But mass incarceration without process creates new injustices and empowers a new elite. I worry about what El Salvador looks like in ten years.
[Dan Banik]
On multilateralism: dissatisfaction with reform in the UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO, etc., has spurred new institutions and forums. How do you see Global South actors’ capacity to reform or build institutions going forward?
[Benedicte Bull]
Ironically, it’s now the U.S. stepping back from some institutions, which adds uncertainty. Building new international bodies is hard. Many Latin American foreign ministries lack continuity and capacity—staff turnover with each government is common. There are exceptions (Mexico, Brazil, Chile), but domestic agendas dominate. Still, parallel forums can matter on specific issues. BRICS has been over-promised, but it did create the New Development Bank and expand currency-swap arrangements—small but concrete steps. The EU is seeking a more institutionalized relationship with Latin America, which is important—if done with humility, patience, and self-critique. Gaza has severely damaged Western credibility on values, and that must be acknowledged. We need partners who share key values across the world: India to a significant extent, Brazil, much of Latin America—no one is perfect, but coalitions are possible.
[Dan Banik]
We’ll leave it there. Always a pleasure, Benedicte. Thank you for joining me.
[Benedicte Bull]
Thank you for the invitation.
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