In Pursuit of Development

Summit diplomacy and African agency — Folashadé Soulé

Episode Summary

Dan Banik speaks with Folashadé Soulé on why some high-level summits are more attractive to African leaders than others, the characteristic features of South-South Cooperation that may help policymakers claim back economic policy space and how African policymakers can negotiate better deals with China.

Episode Notes

Several countries are vying for the African continent’s attention. While there has been considerable attention on China’s and India’s motives and interests, Russia, Germany, France, the UK, Turkey, Japan, South Korea and Middle Eastern countries are all trying to increase their footprint on the continent. 

An important first step for many of these countries is to organize a summit – a major gathering of leaders and other high-level officials to discuss how African countries can further strengthen trade and diplomatic relations with this one country hosting the summit. The goal of these events is basically to promote the idea of achieving win-win outcomes for all involved parties. 

This growth in so-called Africa plus 1 summit diplomacy has generated renewed interest in better understanding the growing competition among major world powers on the continent. But in trying to explain this growing interest in strengthening relations with African countries, there is often a tendency to downplay the role and influence of African countries in setting the agenda of these high-profile events, and how African leaders articulate their needs and interests. 

My guest this week argues that we really need to better understand the motives behind the increased engagement in ‘Africa + 1’ summitry by African politicians and bureaucrats.Indeed, rather than viewing these individuals as passive participants, we must recognize the numerous ways in which such summits and other high-level platforms that involve the continent, offer opportunities for African leaders to express and exert agency in both symbolic and substantial ways.

Dr Folashadé Soulé is a Senior Research Associate at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. She studies agency in Africa’s international relations and the politics of South-South cooperation. She is also the initiator of the Africa-China negotiation workshop series, which brings together African negotiators and senior policymakers to exchange and build better negotiation practices when dealing with China. 

Episode Transcription

(Prepared by Ingrid Ågren Høegh)

 

Banik               It’s great to have you on the show, Folashade. Welcome!

 

Soule                Thank you for having me. 

 

Banik                Let’s begin with this growing phenomenon of all of these major summits, not just India or China, but all kinds of countries, European countries, Russia, all of these countries are having summits and interested in interacting with the whole continent of Africa. And we see this happening quite regularly. And these meetings tend to focus on strengthening trade and investment, security matters, sometimes they end up creating platforms for a renewed relationship with countries on the African continent. Indeed, they seem to be conveying this message that Africa, the whole continent, is important. Not just for some countries, but for the whole world. And while some of these summits have been dubbed as a new scramble for Africa, in a fascinating article in African Affairs, you’ve argued that this new scramble narrative is quite misleading. So, let’s begin there. Why do you think that new scramble narrative is misleading? 

 

Soule                Well, as you said, it almost seems that when you look at the dynamism and the number of summits that are taking place centred on Africa, when you look at some countries that are not conventional like Malta, Estonia, Iceland, they are all producing Africa strategies. It really seems, and it is also the case that Africa has taken the centre stage of the global investment agenda. So, now the continent is considered as the next frontier, you know, it’s the next Asia, in Africa, and investments and international projects in key areas such as energy, infrastructure, finance, have become major driving forces behind the unparalleled growth of African markets. And we are not talking in a Covid period, but statistics are showing that the continent will suffer from the pandemic, but several economies will be back on track again. So, and this has been happening now for a few years. The way not only the media but also the researchers are describing this phenomenon is as the new scramble for Africa, referring to the old scramble for Africa. The one from the Berlin Conference, where former colonial powers decided to divide the continent according to their interests, but also at this conference there were no African representations. The continent and its populations had nothing to say about it. And so, referring to this current context of Africa being at the centre stage of the global investment agenda as the new scramble is something I considered to be misleading. Because we are talking about two different contexts. We are talking about two different statuses, to some extent, because all the African countries are now independent, so they have a say in this agenda. Saying that it's the new scramble is a way of saying that all the strategy is only decided and carried out by either Western countries or emerging powers like China, Russia, India. Whereas what I demonstrated in the article is that African governments and leaders also have their own strategy. And all this summit diplomacy, but more generally speaking, they are also in competition to attract investments from these various countries and new partners.

 

Banik               I think that is a very important point because some would say this is great for Africa because all these countries have been long neglected in terms of investments and this is great in terms of beginning new partnerships. But I absolutely see your point that there is this tendency of describing all these events as being decided by others, and it's not like, in terms of say African leaders deciding to even take part in these summits. Nobody is forcing them to take part. They make up their own minds to participate. And I think that is what I really liked about your piece, because we tend to be dismissive of African agency, and it's about time that we actually discussed what it is. It must be a sophisticated strategy in many ways. So, why do you think the African leaders and sometimes their bureaucratic representatives, why do they decide to participate? What do they hope to get from these major summits? 

 

Soule                As you mentioned, the reason why I decided to focus the article on agency, not only as a sociological concept, but also as a political concept, is that I wanted to ask the following questions, like what are motives behind African leaders' increased engagement in Africa+1, and to what extent does it serve their own interests? Because we mentioned the leaders, the governments, but we can also ask about the populations. And so, one thing that I noticed is that first they choose to attend, and that is why it is so different from the Berlin Conference scramble narrative, but they also choose to attend some summits and not others. 

 

Banik               I found that to be very fascinating. So, it's like sometimes they decide to attend as presidents, some very high-level meetings, and sometimes they decide to send their juniors. 

 

Soule                Yes, exactly. Because in summit diplomacy it's the level of representation that also determines or is a sign of a country's interest in a specific event. Attending as a president, or sending your Minister of Foreign Affairs, well these are not the same levels. It shows a different kind of interest. And so, what I noticed is that these leaders, African leaders, choose more and more, at the presidential level at least, summits with China or with Russia, whereas 20-30 years ago, they would have shown more interest in attending the UK-Africa Summit, if there was one, or the France-Africa Summit. Even currently they are attending these summits with rising powers in larger numbers, more than they attend the United Nations General Assembly. At least I consider it as a sign of interest, but also because, and you asked me before, what are their motives, and in the article, I really separated four different motives and strategies. The first one being attracting investments. Because investments for African countries is a common priority. But they are all in competition. And among the 20 countries that are topping the FDI inflows and outflows currently, none is located in Africa, but FDI flows in Africa are very much located in top five recipient countries that are Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Congo. So, in this context, these countries are very much in competition to attract this FDI, and all these platforms offer an opportunity to promote their countries as the best environment for these investments. So, this is actually not new because this has been expressed in several platforms, several events, like trade meetings in the US-Kenya, while all these countries are trying to position themselves as regional economic hubs, this competition is a way for them to attract investment, but it's also an internal priority for these governments. African political parties need to demonstrate to their populations that they can deliver. And so, that's why also countries like China, and summits organised with China, become interesting because it's an opportunity to get hard infrastructure to be funded, and locally at the local level, to target communities and localities that are in need of a road or certain infrastructure. So, there’s an interdependence of course between the domestic level and the international level. So, for these governments to attend these summits is also a way to attract investment and to be able to, or at least expect to gain votes from certain constituencies. And to counter growing dissatisfaction by some civil society movements, when you look at some countries, autocratic countries, like Togo, or Guinea, having all these partnerships and for these leaders to show this is what we are doing, is also a way for them to at least try to counter some growing dissatisfaction by some civil society movements. And we can discuss whether this is something positive or negative, but at least that's the strategy. 

 

Banik               That's a great point. You know, I was thinking about how the narrative maybe has shifted in terms of these summits because traditionally, I always got this feeling whenever a major power was announcing one of these summits with the whole of Africa, there was this feeling that 'we are doing Africa a favour’. That ‘we are going to lift you out of poverty. We are going to help you develop.' I feel that maybe has shifted of late, where, and I'm thinking of the UK-Africa Summit that was held last year, where it appeared to me much more about, at least between the lines, that it was also about the UK having left or deciding to leave the EU, seeking new opportunities. So, it wasn’t just for Africa, it was also win-win. Something that the Chinese have been highlighting for many years. One of the many things I liked about your piece, the numbers you had about how the last China-Africa Summit, the FOCAC summit, was attended by 51 African leaders, and out of these there were 48 presidents, whereas the UN General Assembly in September 2017 only had 27 leaders attending, and the Russia-Africa summit had 43 heads of state, of which there were 38 presidents, but the UK-Africa Summit only had 21 leaders, of which there were 16 heads of state. So, what does this say about the UK, the former colonial powers, it could also be France, does it indicate that African countries are less interested in pursuing these renewed relations with former colonial powers and much more interested in newer relationships?

 

Soule                Well, you know, I remember this quote by President Macky Sall from Senegal, he was at a conference, I think it was about US investments, and in these platforms, African leaders tend to be sometimes criticised, right? Criticised for engaging with China, or with Russia, and his answer was: China and Senegal, China and Africa have a very particular and special relationship, but everybody would gain a lot from listening to what Africans want. To what African governments are expecting from this relationship. And why am I quoting him? It's because the sense that these leaders have, that African leaders have, is that rising powers or maybe we can’t call them rising powers anymore, but China, Russia, also Turkey, are listening more to their demands. Or they are at least trying to find a partnership that is also aligned on these African governments' interests. Or at least what they've mentioned in their National Development Plans. And a very specific aspect of that is infrastructure funding. So, let's say you are an African leader, infrastructure is a key priority, economic infrastructure is a key priority of your National Development Plan and your strategy because you consider that it may lift some people out of poverty because they will have more access to specific things. Attending a summit like the China-Africa or Russia-Africa or Turkey-Africa, might give you more opportunities to get this infrastructure funded, than attending a UK or France summit. And I'm quoting them a bit because in my engagement and interviews with leaders or with African high-level officials, this is what comes up very often. This idea that in order for their infrastructure projects and also other projects to be funded, it's easier for them to reach out to China, Russia, Turkey than to the UK, because the UK or France or even the EU strategy with Africa, infrastructure is not a key priority. 

 

Banik               That is also my understanding. Because I feel that whenever I've interacted with policymakers, be it presidents or prime ministers or senior civil servants, they often talk about, well they wouldn't say it loudly, but it is often about playing the field. Diversifying the kind of partnerships. The wonderful thing about increased attention from all of these powers, particularly from China and India and Turkey, the UAE, is the fact that it isn’t just the traditional Western donor concerns that they have to address, but also as you were saying infrastructure. So, this expanding or claiming back policy space perhaps is crucial. Having the capacity to do the things that they want and consider important, that their voters consider important. This is not to say that areas such as education or health are unimportant, it's just that infrastructure is something that the West has long not prioritised. So how do you see this policy space? Is that also your understanding when you've interacted with leaders and bureaucrats, that they're interested in expanding and reclaiming that economic policy space? 

 

Soule                Exactly. Absolutely. And that's what I mention in the article. That the second or the third strategy is also to claim back this economic policy space. So, you know, infrastructure used to be a priority or at least part of the aid agenda, and the World Bank was also very much invested in this. I'm talking about the 80s and 90s, but there has been a shift in the aid agenda at some point, with the MDGs also in 2005, where education, health, governance matters became more important. So, one thing, one pattern when you look at all the Chinese funded or Chinese-constructed infrastructure in Africa, these projects, African leaders or African officials asked for funding from these projects to the EU or Western countries before they asked China, but they didn't receive a positive response. So, there has been a shift there, and so looking at it from an African perspective, what these leaders are doing is something like a basket strategy where they know that for infrastructure they will go to China, and since infrastructure is so important to them, they will really prioritise strategic partnerships with China, Russia, Turkey, but for projects related to health, education, also projects related to sustainable development, then they have the EU, the US, so it's about diversifying and be able to have multiple partners in order to not depend on one. So, in terms of policy space, there has been a very strong interventionism in African governments' policy space, and on how they should organise their policies and I'm thinking about the structural adjustment programmes led by the Bretton Woods Institutions in the 1990s. So, we all know that this long conditionality was based on several rules and what the effects have been on African economies. Defunding of key sectors, like transport, health and so on. Well, with these new partners, what African governments can do now is also to claim back the way they are thinking their development plans or strategies. And again, we can discuss further whether this is something that has positive or negative effects, whether it is a good strategy or not, but that's the strategy. That's how they think. And so, bringing in China, Russia, diversifies partners and of course makes their policy space much larger. 

 

Banik               I like that argument because you're basically saying that they are not passive recipients, here you have new leaders, countries now actively setting the agenda. I remember having these discussions in Rwanda a couple of years ago, where I got the impression that the president wasn’t interested, the Rwandan government wasn’t interested in being told that 'we will help you in this sector'. It was rather the Rwandan government saying, 'we've decided that you can have the opportunity of helping us in infrastructure or education or health' and actively setting that agenda, rather than that agenda being set for them. And I think that is the shift that is happening. But one of the things that I wanted to ask you is how does it work in terms of the competition between African countries? You mentioned this earlier, that there is this competition, maybe 5 or 6 major economies that tend to get the major investments, South Africa, Kenya, the big countries, and I see this discourse increasingly in relation to these summits or what China or India is doing on the African continent, so on the one hand there is this narrative that we're doing it with all the countries, but in reality there are some countries that get the major investment projects. So, how do you think that is working out between African leaders? Is there kind of resentment that some countries end up getting all the investments while the others are just picking up the crumbs? And do you think some countries are coordinating their strategies when they come and present Africa as a continent or are we still seeing bilateral negotiations rather than Africa negotiating as a continent? 

 

Soule                Well, let's say that first of all, there is a double competition, right? Or a competition at two levels. There's competition amongst African nations, and there is also competition among all these new partners. And we can come back to that later, how China, Russia and Turkey for instance compete in these countries. But the level of involvement by African heads of state, and the levels of attendance also, in terms of ranking, shows how these leaders are representing their countries, are expecting to get something out of these platforms. And so, they are in competition, but I won’t call it resentment. I would say that their strategies tend to differ from each other. When you look at the rhetoric, one thing that comes up very often is how leaders present themselves as the 'gateway' to Africa. and that is something that started with South Africa in the 90s. We are the economic gateway; you can consider us as the leader of the continent. South Africa played a lot on this discourse. In the 2000s, African economies diversified, South Africa is not the only big economy anymore. But what is interesting to see is how all these other countries, also Morocco, positioning themselves as gateways to the continent. What I'm seeing is that it seems to benefit them, maybe not equally, but they all seem to get something out of this. And so, another rhetoric is one of stability. Senegal, before the riots of these last days, used to present itself as a democratic and politically stable environment. And so, let's say that there is no resentment in the sense that sometimes these projects, some of the megaprojects are very much transregional, or cross-regional. So, it's also if you look at the West Africa region, it's also in their interest to come together. And negotiate with China. So, those are the different strategies that I'm seeing in terms of attracting. It doesn't necessarily translate into equal engagement by China, Russia, but it allows African governments to have more partners in this game. And I want to just say something about reverse competition by China, Turkey and so on. Because we are talking about competition among African nations, but in some cases, and in some countries, since Africa is being the subject of interest for many, you have this tendency now where China is competing with Russia, or with Turkey, or Turkey with India, you know? For contracts, infrastructure contracts, for mining contracts, e.g. in Guinea, Kenya, Senegal, there are specific projects there where Turkey and China are competing. And so, African governments tend to use this interest in order to diversify partnerships, and also not to depend too much on China for infrastructure projects, but also to get maybe better deals in terms of negotiations. Mining contracts in Guinea, where China and Russia are almost, at least for the last 3-5 years, increasingly competing. And one thing, and that's another anecdote that I've seen, is how China and Turkey compete in Benin, how the Turkish embassy was sponsoring, the economic representation more specifically, was sponsoring a leaflet with 3-5 bullet points showing how they are better than China, and how their contractors are more competitive. So, those are new dynamics. You wouldn't have seen this 5-10 years ago. And so, I think this is where African actors are also increasingly having more opportunities to exert more agency and some of them are just using this better than others. 

 

Banik               You are absolutely right. That is also my impression. And I was talking to my colleague Renu Modi on India-Africa relations last week, and she was saying that these new principles that India has formulated in 2018, PM Narendra Modi outlined 10 principles, these are somewhat different from China's in particular, and when I had a look at the principles, one of the first two principles actually touch on how important it is for India to recognise African priorities. And so, while in many ways India maybe is showing that it is different from others by allowing perhaps more of an articulation of African agency, at least in the official rhetoric, so if we can move on to this umbrella of South-South Cooperation (SSC) that India and China often have been using, and many other countries, including Brazil, my impression is, and I'd like to hear your views on it, is that there is often this narrative or discourse framed around win-win, mutual benefit, solidarity, that gives the impression that unlike Western powers, this is different. There is much more recognition for African agency. Is that your impression too? That this umbrella of SSC has changed somewhat? That the rules of the game are different now? 

 

Soule                Well I would say that SSC in its principles have throughout the years changed the development landscapes and also the debates around aid. More and more, they talk about development cooperation than they talk about aid. So there has been some sort of reverse socialisation, if I can call it that, the fact that African governments have been increasingly engaging with southern partners to the detriment of western traditional donors, has pushed western donors to rethink the way they engage with Africa. But SSC is many things. It used to be, in the early 60s and in the ideological context of the Cold War, it used to be very much about alliances, Bandung, Non-Aligned Movement, it was about ideology. Today, this has changed a lot. SSC now refers to a much broader framework for collaboration among countries of the South, whether it’s in the political, social, economic, cultural, environmental, technical domains. When you look at this South-South agenda, India was a strategic player there, and still is in terms of defining this agenda. But, when you look at how it is carried out concretely in these various countries, yes, I would say that it is much more demand driven. I won't say win-win necessarily, I'll get back to this, but first it's demand-driven, definitely. They take more into account African demands. And that's also, you're talking about countries where questions related to morality, respect, traditions, are very much important. And I’m saying that because in the interviews that I've done with leaders, something that comes up very often is at least the southern partners are giving us a bit more consideration, and respect, by listening and by acknowledging that we are able to know what is good for us. So, when you look at just that aspect, I don’t know if it's morality...

 

Banik               Is it about making African leaders and their representatives more comfortable, at ease, that 'I'm also a developing country and I know the kind of problems that you are facing, we've resolved them and therefore what I have to say is more credible than these Westerners, Northerners, who don't know what you're really facing'? It's the credibility, right? 

 

Soule                It’s the credibility, definitely that’s part of the rhetoric. And that has always been the definition of SSC, as a strategy or development practice. It's about sharing knowledge, skills, expertise, and resources to meet development goals through these concerted efforts, but also as a way of saying 'we've been there, we have the same structural issues, so let's share what our solutions have been to address these issues.' so in that regard, it's something that talks more to African leaders than traditional western aid discourse and also, importantly, I mentioned this demand-driven, that's one of the main strategies of the SSC agenda. Now when you look at how it's carried out, it's not always, the ideology is not always in the advantage of the African nations. Business considerations also come into the game. 

 

Banik                So there are some small wins and some big wins, right? 

 

Soule                Exactly. Maybe African governments win a bit more with China, and again, we need to look at case-by-case basis, but it's definitely not a symmetrical win-win relation. because even in SSC, there are some asymmetries. 

 

Banik               I think that's a great point. Let's move on to another set of issues, related to what we were just talking about. This has to do with agency and negotiation. Let's assume that in one of these major summits, there has been some agreement that there will be a project, let's say China has decided with a country in Africa to do certain projects, what characterises then the kind of negotiations that take place once that decision takes place? What is your take on this? I know you've been studying the kind of deal-making processes, the negotiations that take place. How are these negotiated? What kind of strategies do African governments adopt when they negotiate with the Chinese? 

 

Soule                Well, let's say that it's quite large because there are so many practices. And that's why I’ve decided to look at it from a more bottom-up approach, more empirical perspective. Let's say that the key trends that I've seen is first, as you mentioned, most of these deals are discussed in multilateral settings, FOCAC is key here, but also bilateral meetings. All these summits are venues for bilateral negotiations. And so, it's during these bilateral negotiations that there are discussions about opportunities to fund specific infrastructure projects. And there, it starts at the multilateral level and then progressively it comes down to the national level, because at these summits, whether it's ministers or presidents, they receive promises for funding, but at the same time, most of these promises or pledges are tied. The Chinese don’t like to use tied aid, but there are conditionalities and that is that Chinese contractors, in the case of Exim Bank loans, need to construct and implement the project. It's very different when you're talking about projects, infrastructure projects that are funded on national budgets. African national budgets. But what I'm talking about, Exim Bank loans, what happens next is that Chinese contractors, they are also going international, most of them, they are looking for deals outside China, there's also an overproduction of some materials, steel, aluminium and so on. So, they are looking for markets. And they tend to reach out to the Chinese economic missions and the ambassadors in these African countries, and together they reach out to African governments. And when I'm talking about African governments, there's a stark variation across African governments in how they engage with China on these infrastructure projects. In some cases, like Rwanda, Ethiopia, I also think South Africa to some extent, there is a specific unit, within the Ministry of Planning or Ministry of Development, that is considered as the focal point. So, whether it's the Chinese or Russia or Turkey, they need to be working with this unit first, but in other countries, Benin or Mali or Cameroon or Gabon, where these Chinese delegations directly target technical ministries. So, they would go directly and speak to the Ministry of Public Works, or Infrastructure, and this can create some issues. Because when there is no coordination, internally, at the African level, the negotiations tend to be, some of the discussions around norms, labour, tend not to be respected or integrated as they should in the contact. And it sometimes opens way for corruption. So, that's at that level. And then there are three levels. The pre-negotiation stage, the issue that arises there is that from the Chinese side there's a mix of capital and the state. These two are present at the negotiation table on the Chinese side. Whereas on the African side of the table, it's mostly political and technical. So, this already creates a tension because they very often, the Chinese are considered as aggressive, they are perceived as aggressive, because even at the negotiation level, the ambassador tends not to, he doesn't talk a lot. It's mostly the economic actors. They are here to do business. And so, there again, it has changed over time. Even countries like Benin, Cameroon, more and more they bring in experts. Because there is an issue both in terms of translation, language, cultural barriers, tend also to create some divergences. But it’s something that has changed over time, because more and more, some countries rely on some students that are now back from China, another example is Benin who is bringing in China-experts, former Chinese officials, who are able to bridge the gap a bit, between the misunderstandings at the negotiation table. When you move on to the negotiations, the aspects that need to be negotiated is local content, knowledge transfer and ensuring compliance with standards because that's a very strong criticism towards Chinese projects. Compliance with labour, environmental norms. And that is sometimes difficult to negotiate in these Exim Bank projects because they are very much, the conditionality is very much aligned on Chinese interests. But in many cases, these countries are succeeding in saying, 'okay, you come with a loan, but we have our national standards and you need to respect them'. So, strategies for ensuring that there is respect of international or national standards, first, they ensure that there is an independent control or an office that reviews all these standards during the implementation phase of the project. And, one strategy that came up is that they are very often asking Western ...

 

Banik                Right, to monitor that right? 

 

Soule                To monitor that. Reviewing these projects. Because otherwise, these Chinese projects, they are both judge and jury and implementor, and then at the end it's difficult. Once the contract is signed, it's very difficult to come back on it. So those are the issues that very often come up at this stage. More and more African nations now take an external control office that is not an agent of China.

 

Banik               You're raising some fascinating points here. I often hear the Chinese saying that you can't really criticise us because we always respect and comply with local standards, so if it's not sufficient it's because the African country in question has insufficient standards. So, don’t criticise us. But, going back to these negotiating styles etc. I think it's extremely important that we are aware that it's not just in relation to say China, but low income countries often in international or multilateral discussions, there’s often this lack of resources, legal and financial expertise, so obviously if you have an agency, like South Africa, to negotiate, then you are in a stronger situation than in a country where you don’t have that expertise. Say in West Africa, if the Chinese companies go directly to a ministry, obviously that could lead to all kinds of problems of policy coherence. So, a final set of issues I wanted to ask you, is if you were to think about the future and advice African ministers, officials in terms of negotiating styles, or techniques, and to empower African negotiators, and perhaps also advise them to involve the public, what would you suggest? What kinds of strategies should African leaders, governments adopt in the future to get the best deals? 

 

Soule                Well, I would start by saying that it's already very important for even the tiniest African nations to understand that if a big country like China wants to engage with them, it’s because they have an interest in engaging with them. So, this is already an important factor to keep in mind that they also need you. However small you are, isn’t necessarily not the reason to negotiate the best deal. And it's not a reason to accept everything. Because there is finance on the table. Because that is often what is happening. It's that they fear the finance opportunity will go to another nation. And so, they tend to accept whatever deal is on the table or they negotiate not in their own interest. So, advice that I would give is firstly to have an internal policy coordination. China is the continent's first trade partner and China is the top fifth investor in Africa. But very few countries have a China strategy. But they do have strategies for other countries or at least for the EU. China, there is no China strategy. It's important to come up with one that is inclusive, I mean engages with the larger state apparatus, whether it's in the presidency or MFA, it's important to engage with various levels of the state apparatus. So, that's a coherence strategy. That’s the first advice. The second is getting to know or increase knowledge to get to know China better. To build on existing knowledge. During the Cold War, there were so many African students that went to China to study. But they are not mobilised by their governments. Not included in the negotiation teams. It’s important to understand and avoid all these misinterpretation issues due to language and culture barriers. Having someone who has lived and studied or maybe worked in China, to some extent it can be an asset. So, it's about mobilizing the best capacities internally. And, external ones. You mentioned the legal aspects. Mobilising external expertise in Africa-China negotiations is something that has been raised a lot. And there is some expertise available outside. It's also important to learn from one another. I've been involved in setting up these knowledge sharing seminars, where African negotiators come together from various countries to discuss and to learn from one another. That’s one of the key ideas in SSC. Because most of them are engaging with the same Chinese corporations, but they don’t get the same output. So, learning from one another, sharing lessons, is also very important to prepare better negotiations. And I think the final aspect is to look at this not only at the national level but also the regional African level. To involve the African Union, to have a regional strategy for engagement with China, or to be able to provide support for African governments. Because what I've shown in my articles is that African governments have shown resilience, but it's important to have a framework agreement at the African Commission level and invite China to have a dialogue. This will allow Africans to better organise themselves and to bridge the gap of misunderstandings that happen often at the negotiation table. And, very often, it comes down to small things, like the way the contract has been written, they don’t understand the same thing, when the contract is translated in French or English, the African side and the Chinese side don’t have the same understanding, and then once the contract is signed, there are several issues due to lack of knowledge or understanding. So, it's important at the practical and operational level to have these China teams within these African bureaucracies and state apparatus. And also to have these discussions at the African Union level. 

 

Banik               Folashade, it was such a pleasure to speak with you today. Thank you so much for coming on my show. 

 

Soule                Thank you for having me. It was a pleasure. 

 

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Thank you for listening to In Pursuit of Development with Professor Dan Banik from the University of Oslo’s Centre for Development and the Environment. Please email your questions, comments and suggestions to inpursuitofdevelopment@gmail.com. 

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