Dan Banik and Stephen D. Krasner discuss the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the fragmented global order, and why the United States ought to promote “good-enough governance” rather than trying to consolidate democracy around the world.
Steve Krasner has for decades been one of the most influential international relations scholars in the world. He is the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations and a Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute and the Hoover Institution.In 2002, he served as Director for Governance and Development at the National Security Council. And from 2005 to 2007, he was Director of the Policy Planning at the US Department of State.
In his latest book, How to Make Love to a Despot: An alternative foreign policy for the 21st Century, Steve Krasner argues that because prosperous, democratic nations are exceptions in international politics, the United States ought to adopt policies “acceptable to despotic rulers”. This means coming to terms with the “good-enough governance” of nondemocratic governments rather than trying to consolidate democracy around the world.
Host:
Professor Dan Banik (Twitter: @danbanik @GlobalDevPod)
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Banik It should not come as a big surprise that I'm a huge fan of your work and I have enjoyed talking with you about all kinds of issues over the years, so it's a great pleasure for me to have you on the show. Welcome.
Krasner Thank you, thanks for taking the time and it's good to see you again too.
Banik Steve, you are of course one of the big gurus of IR, International relations. I have to start by asking you to reflect a bit on the current situation as you see it. We have a major war going on at the moment between Russia and the Ukraine. Influential IR scholars, some of your colleagues have been claiming that it's the US's fault, it's our fault, it’s the Western powers that are trying to expand NATO that has caused this war, that Russia was really upset. Of course, many others disagree with that point of view. But amidst all this talk, there is a lot of focus I see on this principle of sovereignty and global governance appears to be fragmented and the world looks pretty chaotic as I see it. So, given that you are one of the most influential and well-respected scholars in this field, Steve, how would you characterise the field of international relations today?
Krasner I think the situation is very problematic and I think the problem comes from this combination of sovereignty and the industrial revolution. Let's say we went back 50 years or 100 years, and everybody has taken advantage of the industrial revolution, I think the world would actually be quite stable. In fact, I think what's happening is here you have the notion of sovereignty, which is a sort of a crazy idea which grew up originally in Europe over a long period of time and I think states that became sovereign states in Europe were either large and powerful, or they're like Switzerland, or Norway, able to defend themselves, or in Norway you could say it has had some mixed success. So, I think what's happened is, this principle of sovereignty was adopted all over the world. And by the end of the 1960s, the idea that states should be able to defend themselves was kind of out the window, which was great if you're a leader and wanted these things. So, I think what's happening is you now have a world which you have for a lot of very weak states, especially in Africa, but even in Europe, which can't defend themselves while at the same time, they haven't really industrialised. This is especially true in Latin America and Africa and that's very problematic. So, you've got a lot of weak states unable to defend themselves in a situation in which they can be invaded by their neighbours. So, it's true, Russia has not invaded the Baltic states, probably because they are members of NATO and it's not worth the risk. But that's not a really stable situation. Russia could easily dominate its neighbours. The United States could easily dominate its neighbours; in Canada we don't care, and with Mexico, we failed on. I think it makes the migration process unsolvable. If I lived in Guatemala I would try to get to the US; if I lived in tropical Africa, I certainly try to get to Europe and that's because these are places that are poor, they're weak. It's really an incentive for individuals to move. If you look at the migration issue which has been a big deal in the US and even in Europe, it's very understandable why lots of people are moving. Now let's say that that tropical Africa is rich, or Guatemala was as rich as the United States, I think you'd have no issue. Even if you go back to the 1880s or even the 1850s, the biggest gap in per capita income was 4 to 1, now it's at 100 to 1. So, at 100 to 1 people are wanting to leave, at 4 to 1 they are not that anxious to leave. You see this world in which it seems much easier to move around, at least in the industrial world you can get any place in 24 hours. That was not true in the past, you go back to sort of the beginning in the United States in the 1760s or 1800s, it was more or less the same. It was hard to move and it wasn't worth it. Now it's easy to move and it's very much worth it. So, I think the natural system is highly problematic and, in some ways, if we look at the traditional Chinese system and when China was at the centre, that actually makes more sense.
Banik You've written so many books and you've been very good at finding really catchy titles. I love the one on “Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy”, when you read that title, you know what you're basically going to say. I wanted to request you to reflect a bit on this because a lot of observers, when you wrote the book, but even now questioning the viability of the sovereign state, particularly because of the acceptance of human rights, minority rights, the role of the World Bank financial institution, and globalisation. But you've argued that the presence of these norms, these long-standing norms, are frequently violated. In fact, this is actually an enduring feature of international relations. Is that still the case? It's not the international norms, it's the differences in national power and interest that continue to be the most powerful explanation for the behaviour of states today. How do you see that?
Krasner I still think that's true. I think in the past, well, it's not that important if you look at Europe, I mean Switzerland was a small state, not very wealthy, able to defend itself, it wasn't worth conquering Switzerland. I mean you can see what happened to Norway in the Second World War, it was worth the Germans conquering Norway and they did it pretty easily. I think the problem is now, sovereignty has persisted because it's very much in the interest of leaders to have it persist. So, you got to speak at the UN, you get lots of money, you get wealth, you get all this stuff, being a leader, even a very small and poor state. But I think the gaps have grown than what they were in the past. The United States administer had the opportunity to expand in Central America in the 19th century and did not do it. But it was also the case that, I haven't actually looked at this, but my guess is that per capita and in Guatemala, Nicaragua, there were probably less in the US but not that much less. Now they're really less, you know, 10 times less and so the incentive for people to move is greater and that's very destabilising.
Banik The international system, as you have often written about is full of anarchy. There is no authoritative actor that can prevent one state from pursuing foreign policy objectives by changing the domestic authority structures, or by influencing those leaders down there or domestic forces elsewhere. And yet Steve, at the moment you mentioned migration, the big talk these days is climate change, is addressing global public goods, preventing the next pandemic. How are we in a position do you think to provide this? Is it possible, because global public goods are supposed to be non-excludable, it should apply to everyone. It's not just something that the United States finances for itself. It should also benefit China, it should be enjoyed by everyone, without diminishing the benefits that they deliver to others. So, there's this non rival aspect. If we go back to sovereignty and realism, people looking out for their own interests, it is power that is important. Do you see any hope to address these larger global challenges that require financing for global public goods?
Krasner OK, so I admit I don't. Take the United States, it was downtown Manhattan, Lower Manhattan was flooded, I think it was 1905. These are rich people with very expensive real estate and still not much happened. So, I'm pretty pessimistic if you look at something like climate change, well, would I expect India or China to cut back? No, I don't. And I think they have a very good argument. You know, you rich people.
Banik Yeah, you guys polluted.
Krasner Will you actually get significant cutbacks in the US? I would say no. I would think if you look at climate change, in particular, our best hope is not that we're actually going to arrive with global governance. But I think our best hope is that we'll have technology that may make the problem easier.
Banik That's what a lot of people say. They're putting their hopes on technology.
Krasner That's what I hope too, because I don't see the political system working. I mean, would the American president adopt policies that say doubling the price of gasoline, it will never happen. You see that while the impact may be global, the elections are national or local. I think if the US gets more efficient wind, better solar, better batteries that's our best hope. But I'm very pessimistic that we'll be able to arrive at an agreement that would be made at a global level, very pessimistic.
Banik But we have had some progress, Steve. Countries do sign treaties, sometimes they are binding, and you could constrain the power of these states, right? You could get them to act in the in the global interest sometimes. But you don't see that happening in terms of preventing the next pandemic, for example?
Krasner Right. So, I think that you've been able to do that when it's pretty cheap and easy to do, so look at the Montreal Accord in 1987. It was easy to get rid of Freon because you had a substitute gas. Do I see it happening now? I'm pretty pessimistic about it happening now.
Banik Let's get cracking, this fantastic book that you've written, again another fantastically catchy title. How to Make Love to a Despot: An Alternative Foreign Policy for the 21st Century. Steve, you are arguing in this book that the United States must actually stop doing what it is doing, trying to remake the world according to its own image and must learn how to make love to despots, how to get not good governance, but good enough governance. Tell us a bit more, especially why should we not strive for the best possible outcome? Democracy, good governance? Why should we settle for second best?
Krasner I don't know what the second best actually looks like or even if the US can do it. But the US was very successful in 1945. Japan plus Western Europe were also very successful, but rhe US has totally failed since then. Korea became a democracy, but it had lots of hard aid, it was a dictatorship until 1989. If you look at neighbours of the US, Canada has been very successful, but look at Mexico and every place else. It's very hard to do. So, I think if you look at democracy, it's true that it's a great form of government and it seems to work very well. It doesn't necessarily mean that it can happen, and I think for the US in particular, it's very influenced by Britain in the 17th century. What happened in Britain was that the king had his head cut off, you had a dictatorship with Oliver Cromwell for a decade – that failed; Parliament invited the Stuarts back and then threw the Stuarts out in 1688 and invited some new people. But I think the lesson to be drawn from that is that democracy works if you A) have deep divisions in society and B) both sides see that they can't possibly win. If you think you can win if you're a dictator in Guatemala or Venezuela, I think you'll try to win. So, that’s the trouble. If you look at the record of the US historically, yeah, it did great after World War Two, when Germany and Japan were totally destroyed. But it's done pretty badly otherwise.
Banik Some of the problems as I see it, Steve, is that the US, when it sort of preaches democracy, or that applies actually to a lot of Western countries, the reaction is pretty swift because people say look at your own country, look at your own system, it is dysfunctional. Look at racism look at all these other problems that you have, why are you pointing fingers at us?
Krasner I agree with that. So, I think racism is a deep problem deep deep problem in the US and it's true that things have changed. You're not here anymore, but even in the last five years, you see many more interracial couples on TV. But it doesn't necessarily mean the trickle-down works, it would be great, but at the same time the gap and income gap in wealth between blacks and other people, whites in the US have grown. I think the US does have real failings. But I think the deeper problem is we have this myth that we support democracy and freedom, which we haven't always lived up to, obviously. But the problem is making democracy and freedom work in other parts of the world turns out to be very difficult. Leaders in other parts of the world know their countries better than we do. When I was in government in 2006, I was very, very enthusiastic about a Norwegian initiative, which was attempting to make an effort to better govern raw materials.
Banik Well, the EITI – the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
Krasner Yeah EITI. Norway has put a lot of money into it, which seemed to me like a great idea. What was the first country to be certified by EITI? Azerbaijan, which was totally corrupt. They did get thrown out eventually. But it turns out if you were Heydar Aliyey or Alyev’s son, you want to run Azerbaijan, you're able to fix things, so you qualified with the EITI. But were you really able to change the regime? Probably not. I think it's a great idea. I was very enthusiastic about it, and it just didn't work. The trouble for the US is this myth of democracy, which really motivated the country. But it's very hard to get democracy in other places.
Banik I'm thinking about when, remember all those years ago, when you and I did the mook on what works, promising practises in International Development, we taught this course and I remember you in one of the lectures saying that modernization theory has failed, institutional capacity approaches are flawed. These cannot really explain how and why economic growth takes place and modernization theory, for example, you've been arguing, cannot explain how economic growth begins. Institutional capacity approaches can't explain why a powerful state like the US would not be self-serving. So, talking about democracy promotion Steve, what happened with democracy promotion and US involvement in Iraq, in Afghanistan? Because these are seen to be failed attempts, and I see that in the book that is your one of your main arguments, saying look, “I was there, it didn't work”, and you were a key part of some of these decisions in the George W Bush presidency. So, what happened with these US efforts?
Krasner I think that Bush was absolutely sincere. Until you get democracy in Afghanistan until you get democracy in Iraq, theoretically, it made sense. Say if Iraq became democratic and had grown quickly, Iraq would have become a beacon of light. In fact, I'm actually more pessimistic than I was when we originally taught the course because many of these things have been tried and they failed. I thought they would be successful, and they haven't been. I thought if you had external governance that would be great, that would work. I think our policy towards China from 1978 to 2020 was very much guided by modernization theory. We thought China would become rich, it would get a bigger middle class, the middle class would be democratic, and China would become democratic.In fact, that is not what happened. China stayed Chinese. So, I think this idea that you could have external government that would work, I think it's turned out to be really hard to do and I can't find anything that was dramatically successful. I thought 10 years ago it would work, not anymore.
Banik One of the things I find fascinating, of course with you and some of our other Stanford colleagues is that you've also been in the policy making business and you've returned to academia. You've had all of these stints; you were the director for policy planning at the State Department in 2005. As I understand it Steve, over the years, of course you've written about this, you've talked about this, that President George W Bush was initially focused on domestic issues and in the 1990s, of course, and until 2001 there was a lot of optimism about the global order, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the increase in the number of democracies all over the world. Our good friend that we have in common, Frank Fukuyama, was talking about the end of history, democracy and free markets are the things, and that would be the legitimate ways for parts, for prosperity, human well-being. Samuel Huntington was, of course, warning against the clash of civilizations that it was religion and culture that would be crucial, then 9/11 happened. You were, I think in the National Security Council at that time, or I think I read that you were in Washington and you saw, I mean you could see the smoke from the Pentagon, you actually bike to the Potomac River and you saw that thing happen. 9/11 changed everything, right? A new enemy was identified. You had Islamic terrorism all of that. So how did that land Landmark event 9/11, how did that change American foreign policy? Was there more focus on democracy? Was there now a new enemy? How was it for you to be in the State Department amidst all of this?
Krasner I would say initially because I was there when George Bush was president, there was more focus on democracy and if it worked, it would have been great. The trouble is, we don't have an alternative, so it's fine to say yeah, as I've argued in writing that we can't get democracy, but what do we substitute for it? Good enough governance, it's nice, but people are not going to die for that. I've been thinking about this for a long time, and I actually don't know. I thought security maybe, we have to make ourselves more secure. But that would have meant we go into Afghanistan beat the crap out of them and leave. The US didn’t do that, they went into Afghanistan and tried to remake Afghanistan and totally failed. Went into Iraq and tried to remake Iraq and failed. So, I think the problem for the US is a loss of power and this governing myth of democracy you can't actually implement democracy and the one way of thinking has changed, is democracy looked great. Countries that were democratic got rich; I could give you a story about why that happened. Countries that were not democratic stayed poor, I thought Fukuyama was right and what I'm seeing in retrospect that I don't think Frank would disagree with this, yes, you have elections, but they may be fake elections.
Banik I spoke with Frank about this, and he says that he underestimated the rise of China.
Krasner I definitely underestimated the rise of China. In 2010 I thought China would rise, it was rising but I think it was true that the American establishment thought China would be democratic. That has not been the case. What you have to ask, if you were Chinese and you were sort of looking out. And you found the formula that seems to work. Is Xi Jinping is going to give up power? I would say no. So, I think if you look at US-China policy, it's going to depend on what the Chinese do. If they're successful with an autocratic regime that's actually rich, the US would be in a lot of trouble.
Banik I was in Washington in January of this year, and I was surprised at this anti-China rhetoric. It's a whole different bubble in Washington, which I think underestimates the perception and in other parts of the world, including in Europe. It's this polarised discourse about beating China. Whereas in many countries, including some of the countries I study Steve in Africa, they don't want to take sides, they want to do business with both. So, I don't understand why there's this one-sided focus, the China bashing focus in the US, it continues.
Krasner I was shocked too. The US changed and changed very quickly. But I think in the past, we as I said, we thought China would be rich and become democratic instead of being rich and still autocratic, even more autocratic. It's not what the US expected. Once we saw that China was going to be an enemy, perceived as an enemy and not perceived as a friend it's very problematic. Look at Taiwan, to get back to sovereignty a little bit. They have had many wargames the US against China, and China always wins. So, will the US be able to defend Taiwan? I would say probably not. The Chinese don't have to invade Taiwan; they could just lob some rockets. And so,I think that's highly problematic. So, this world was great for the US, which of course we didn't see and here, its army, which is able to overthrow anybody anywhere. We view ourselves, the US, as being benign, if you were an African leader, you would be sitting in the back your mind a little bit worried, right?
Banik I've also chatted with Joe Nye about soft power, which is of course, what he would say the US has more of than China, that winning hearts and minds. But you know, even there, if I'm to be honest, Steve, I feel like the US is soft power is on the wane when one has this very harsh rhetoric. It's declining, even the soft power is declining because one is not seeing the world as many other countries are seeing it.
Krasner I think that you're basically right. So, I think where did this soft power of the US come from? It came from a culture that seems very strong. But I think it's been really hard for the US to see, if you're a military, it can overthrow anybody, anywhere that makes people nervous. Then the Americans would say, well, yes, that's true we could overthrow anybody, but we've been quite restrained, which I think is actually sort of true, but it's not going to comfort other people. They will be very nervous about the US.
Banik Talking about good enough governance, you identify certain criteria and I have this in front of me. Good enough governance would have some of these following characteristics. One is that the public authorities would be able to provide some form of public order and security, that there might be rule by law, not necessarily rule of law. There would be some economic growth if not sustained growth, at least the level of wealth that could be achieved would be limited by certain incentives, etc. But there would be some growth. I find it interesting where you also point out that some form of corruption has to be tolerated. You can't get rid of all forms of clientelism and patronage and the state is able to provide a reasonable amount of public services. Then elections would be used to legitimate agreements that had been reached ex ante among political elites. So, these are some of the features of good enough governance. What would you highlight as the most central aspect here? Is it elections? Is it corruption? Is it political settlements? What is key for you, or all of these, perhaps.
Krasner Well, I don't have a good answer. I would say the critical thing is at least for one to stay in power, that may mean rigging elections, and it almost certainly means corruption. I think the problem is the US had this sort of myth that yes, we'd fight, and we'd spread democracy. Would people fight for good enough governance, that's been my problem and I think they won't fight for good enough governance. It may be a catchy phrase, not mine, but it doesn't mean that people will fight and die for it. So, if you look at fighting and dying you fight and die for democracy. Well, what happens if you can't get democracy and that’s a problem the US has not solved. It's sort of myths on the one hand, good enough governance government may be accurate. I think it actually it's accurate. But it doesn't mean that people would fight and die for good enough governance.
Banik What I really enjoyed in the book is you point to two aspects that the US should do more of. One is being more humble, the role of humility is crucial and also addressing false expectations. We have these high expectations, we always want the best possible outcomes, but in reality, it doesn't turn out the way we thought it would.
Krasner Look at the US in Vietnam, where it has waged a lot of unsuccessful wars. Has the US really changed? I would say no. I think it's a fundamental problem that we had these high expectations and they're consistently disappointed and they will be disappointed. Why will it be disappointing? Because getting democracy, actually turns out to be quite hard, much harder than I thought. Simply saying, well, we have a democracy, and the democracies are great, forgetting about the founders of the United States, it turns out to not be enough, right? I mean, it's not enough to say we're great, we're democratic, and we're wealthy, because if you're a leader in say Guatemala or Myanmar or wherever you want to stay in power, that's the critical thing. So, staying in power means it's been great for us we don't care about other parts of the country.
Banik Your argument, basically, Steve, is that rather than aiming so high and trying to reach the treetops rather than aiming sky high. Maybe by reaching the treetops we will be able to prevent terrorist attacks, address global problems, maybe address migration, maybe even make life bearable for the people in these countries.
Krasner I think that analytically it is correct. Would the US actually be able to act on it? That's what I'm sceptical about. So, if you went into Afghanistan and you said, this would follow my logic, we're going to go in, we'll make sure that Afghanistan is not harbouring terrorists. We'll beat them up and then we'll leave. I think it would be hard to do and I think what Bush did actually made more sense to the American public. We're going to go into Afghanistan; we'll make Afghanistan democratic and that will be great. We're going to act in terms of our own security, we'll go into Afghanistan we will beat you up and then we will leave. Would you actually? I'm not sure that you'd be able to find support for doing that.
Banik Let's talk a little bit about your experiences being a Peace Corps volunteer in Nigeria all of those years ago when you went there, you taught English at a school in northern Nigeria. You and your fellow colleagues had high hopes. When I read this latest book, Steve, I understand why you're pessimistic because you're not very pleased with how things turned out in Nigeria.
Krasner I think if you looked at Nigeria when I was there in 1963-64-65 and look at Nigeria now. I think in the 1960’s we said look, we're going to Nigeria, we'll get of colonialism, Nigeria will be democratic, and it will be rich and it's certainly not rich and it hasn’t done that well with democracy. I was very typically optimistic in the 1960’s. I'm definitely not optimistic now. I think America at some point in the 1960’s was thinking we will get rid colonialism, each country will be democratic, and they'll be just like us. In fact, it hasn't turned like that.
Banik What would be a good case for good enough governance you in the book you write about Colombia? Well, why is that a good case Steve?
Krasner Well, because, Colombia had this civil war for a long time and there were deep divisions within the country, it kind of got frozen, it's sort of OK, but not great. I think we have no idea of how to make it great. That's the problem. I think the progress in Colombia reflects the fact that fighting between the left and the right is taking place for a long time. The right response makes some compromises, but it's the best we can hope for now. See my problem is that I think, yeah, it's fine just sitting back in the university saying we're going to do A, B and C and this is what will work, it doesn't mean that will actually translate into political success.
Banik But I think there are good reasons why our political leaders talk about human rights democracy because they think that's what their voters want to hear.
Krasner I agree, I think that's right, you want to hear these things. If you look at the United States Senate, there are deep divisions. I think Trump is a crook, but a substantial part of the population will vote for him. I can sort of understand why. But what happens is suddenly the population becomes heavily Central American, it's shocking for people, so it's great if you take Marjorie Taylor Green’s side. I've been to Georgia, but not to north-western Georgia. You had this world in which in the 1950s or 1960s, Blacksgot off the sidewalks, they don't do that anymore. For the Marjorie Taylor Greens of the world, that's pretty shocking. Now, I think it's great, but it's easy for me to say, look at the housing crisis in California, people can be very liberal unless you're going to build any expensive housing next to them. An example for me, this was in the 2000’s, I guess maybe 1990s. Stanford wanted to build housing on some of its own land that was not being used. I think there were 7 houses and the faculty got up in arms, you can't do this, it's terrible, we don't want a new house built next to us. Eventually the university backed down. Here were people at Stanford who were fairly well-off building housing for others, for professors and there was still a huge protest.
Banik Yeah, it's fine if it happens far away. It can't happen in our backyard, that is the problem. And that's the problem with preaching in general. But I wanted to also ask you about Venezuela, because that is also an interesting case, where the US, I'm not really sure what the US was trying to do, so after Chavez died, Maduro came to power and there's been this back and forth and it's still in limbo. So, is the US you think trying to make Venezuela democratic, should it be working with Maduro the despot?
Krasner So I heard the US is working with Maduro now. Is the US trying to make Venezuela democratic? Yes. But if you look at the Caribbean, Central America, South America, there haven't been that many successes. Chile is certainly pretty successful. Brazil is kind of mixed, Argentina sort of mixed maybe more successful, but I think the key is to say you need to work in ways that are political. So, in Venezuela, I think the US is actually pretty stuck, we'd like to get rid of Maduro, but we have no idea how to do it or who to replace him.
Banik Because this is something that again, I know you've been interested in the role of external actors in State Building, right? We're trying to sort of conclude the story on my show. I've had lots of guests talking about the role of foreign aid. You know, we want to promote governance, democracy, rights for certain groups. We want to improve the livelihoods, we want to combat deprivation, we want to reduce corruption. All of these ideas we have about how our experience are based on our values, can change the world can help others. I mean help as in quotation marks. In many ways, Steve these are important, it's not always like we're trying to help, maybe we are also doing it for ourselves. We have a self-interest; some would say there's an enlightened self-interest. So, what role do you see external actors playing in state building? What role do you see of aid going forward?
Krasner Basically, I would say small. I don't think these things are bad, so I wouldn't say that foreign aid is bad or anything like that. But the idea that you would use foreign aid and eventually these countries would be rich and democratic, just like us, that I think is a stretch. So, I think the problem is that political elites in these countries, know these countries well, and we can try and come in with good government, but it's going to fail. I think good enough governance might be successful, but it will not be easy. So, when I say, look, let's not pretend that we can get rid of corruption completely; is corruption a bad thing? Yes. Do political elites in other countries stay in power because of corruption? I would say yes. So, would we actually be able to devise a policy, that local elites would accept I think that would be very hard. So again, if you look at EITI, I know Norway put a lot of money into this, I thought when I was in the State Department in 2006, that EITI was a great idea. But is Aliyev going to want to give up power? I would say no, he is going to want to stay there, the family is going to want to stay in power in Azerbaijan and that will mean a lot of corruption. So I thought it was a great idea, it's just a great idea you couldn't implement because implementing would have meant that their family would have been committing suicide, which they would not want to do.
Banik So Steve, a lot of our conversation today has been largely pessimistic. Are there any grounds for optimism going forward? Give us some hope, give my listeners some positive news.
Krasner I think there may be some optimism within countries, not internationally. So, are things getting better in the US? Sure, but it’s slow, you can see that progress is hard. If you look at the global level, it's true I'm pretty pessimistic because the real problem is this American myth of democracy which has failed. Could it be replaced by something else? I don't know now what that could be. So, I think I'm not totally pessimistic about the United States, but if Trump wins the next election, I'll be very pessimistic. So, I admit, in 2016 I thought his chance of winning.
Banik Everybody was shocked.
Krasner Right, this guy is a crook, he's from New York, everybody can see it. But it's a big country with a lot of people and you look at things like gun control in the US, 20 kids were killed at Sandy Hook, that was more than a decade ago and the US did not do anything about it. So, why not? Because there are some people, granted a minority, but some people really think that having an assault rifle is a natural right. So, I think it will change, I could tell you it might change, but it clearly, it's not changing quickly.
Banik I'm thinking about some of the positive news in terms of global development, China reducing extreme poverty, and India is doing pretty well. These new powers are becoming more and more influential. When you were at the State Department in 2005, 2006, 2007, did you foresee this kind of growth that these emerging powers would be so influential so quickly?
Krasner No, not really, I would say definitely no. But you also thought, look, these countries, especially China, they'll become wealthy, and a wealthy China will be just as I said before, just like us. But people absolutely could not see this. You have the big change that you observed in the US and say have a much wealthier China, but they are not like us. The transformation if you'd said in 2006 China will do so well, you might have said that if they do very well, they'll be just like the United States. In fact, the big shock has been they've done very well that was not so shocking.
Banik What is striking is that from being a rule taker, they're becoming more rule makers in international, in multilateral settings, there's much more of an effort at reshaping the multilateral system now that China has as its ambition than was the case before. So, it's almost like that is what is angering many of the Western powers that many of these other countries, like China, pushing back and trying to put their people in influential UN positions, trying to change the rules that Western powers were doing for a while.
Krasner I think if you look at China, they might have been able to do these things because they're big and they've been fairly prosperous. That's why, as I said before if China actually continues to grow much faster than the US or Western Europe, they're going win. There's no way the US is going to be able to stay in the Western Pacific in 20-30 years if China continues to get wealthy. Russia has become autocratic under Putin. Its military actually looks much weaker than we expected; we thought Ukraine would fall in two weeks, instead they are still fighting. Is Russia able to remake the international system? I would say no. So, I think China's success depends on China's power, which depends on Chinese economic growth. So, I do think that Chinese economic growth will falter, but if it does not, then a wealthy, autocratic China would certainly be model that would be very attractive to much of the world.
Banik My 17-year-old Alex is by the way, 17 years now. He recently wrote a school essay on some of the major branches of IR theory, and he told me that your name cropped up in his Google search and then he realised how influential you have been in the field because earlier you were just our family friend. It was so lovely to see you. Thank you so much for coming on my show.
Krasner So good to see you. Thanks for taking the time.